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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TASTERS' LTD., INC., 
Employer-Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 900451 -CA 
Category 7 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has jurisdiction of this Petition for Review 
pursuant to Article 8, §3 of the Utah Constitution; Utah Code 
Annotated, §§78-2a-3(2) (a) and 63-46b-16; and Rule 14 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
ISSUE I 
WHETHER THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S ANALYSIS AND 
APPLICATION OF §35-4-22(j)(5) WAS REASONABLE AND 
RATIONAL. 
ISSUE II 
ARE THE BOARD'S FINDINGS OF FACT COMPLETE AND 
BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE? 
ISSUE III 
ARE TASTERS' DEMONSTRATORS EMPLOYEES OR INDEPEN-
DENT CONTRACTORS UNDER §35-4-22(j)(5)(A) THROUGH 
(T)? 
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE 
Section 35-4-22(j)(5) is set forth in its entirety in 
Appendix A. Section 35-4-22(j ) (5) provides in part: 
(j)(5) Services performed by an individual 
for wages or under any contract of hire, 
written or oral, express or implied, are con-
sidered to be employment subject to this 
chapter, unless it is shown to the satisfac-
tion of the commission that the individual is 
an independent contractor. The commission 
shall analyze all of the facts in Subsections 
(A) through (T) under the common-law rules 
applicable to the employer-employee relation-
ship to determine if an individual is an 
independent contractor. An individual is an 
independent contractor if the weight of the 
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evidence supports that finding. The follow-
ing factors are to be considered if applic-
able: [Factors (A) through (T) omitted. See 
Appendix A for complete statute.] 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Tasters is in the business of providing workers to brokers 
and manufacturer representatives for the purpose of demonstrating 
various products in grocery and department stores. Record at 180 
(All notations hereafter prefixed by "R" refer to pages in the 
record and are set forth in numerical order in Appendix B.) Each 
demonstrator works on an on-call, part-time basis, with no guar-
antee of any particular schedule or number of hours. R. 222 Jobs 
are usually only available, however, on weekends, the times when 
grocery and department stores are at their busiest. R. 145, 214 
Each demonstrator is free to accept or decline offered assignments 
as he or she sees fit. R. 145, 151, 222, 223 
Tasters gives each demonstrator a two-page set of sugges-
tions concerning the performance of their duties, including 
details such as attire, length of breaks, product display, and 
demonstration tactics. Demonstrators are advised not to have 
children present, smoke, read, or sit while on the job. (See 
Appendix C.) 
Orientation meetings are sometimes held for demonstrators, 
but attendance is not required. R. 218 Sometimes training 
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sessions are set up by Tasters on behalf of brokers to give 
demonstrators instruction on a new product. R. 181, 182 Demon-
strators are paid by the broker or manufacturer for those 
sessions. R. 158, 182, 185 Those who do not attend are not 
selected to demonstrate that specific product, but are not jeop-
ardized in any other way. R. 186 
Once a demonstrator agrees to do a particular demonstration, 
he or she works according to a schedule communicated by Tasters. 
R. 161, 173 The store manager dictates hours of demonstrations, 
though the demonstrator can request minor adjustments in time 
frame. R. 184 The demonstrator's performance in the store is 
not closely monitored by Tasters. In fact, there is little need 
to monitor performance as the task required of demonstrators is 
straightforward and untechnical. R. 186 The store manager or 
the broker are aware of what the demonstrators are doing, how-
ever, and can and do make suggestions on how to display or sell 
the product. R. 146 
At the end of each demonstration, demonstrators are required 
to submit a report to Tasters detailing the amount of product 
sold. (See Appendix D.) This information is collected for the 
benefit of the broker, but the printed report form also provides 
room for store managers to sign off on the demonstrator's per-
formance. This is primarily to let Tasters know that the demon-
stration was in fact done, but managers can also make comments 
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about a demonstrator's performance. In this way Tasters gets 
feedback on whether or not the demonstrator's performance was 
satisfactory. R. 147, 184, 240 
The demonstrators are either provided the supplies used in 
demonstrations or are reimbursed for the expense of supplies. 
R. 193, 228 Tasters approves or disapproves requests for ex-
penses. R. 215, 232 The demonstrators provide equipment such 
as frying pans and card tables for the demonstrations. R. 162 
Virtually all items used in the demonstrations are items the 
demonstrators already own so monetary outlay for each demonstra-
tor in terms of equipment is minimal. R. 153, 188 Tasters some-
times provides microwave ovens and then charges its clients 
rental fees for their use. 
Demonstrators are paid by the job and not by the hour. 
R. 204, 209 However, each job is defined by how many hours the 
demonstration is supposed to last. On occasion, demonstrators 
have been allowed to leave when all of the product assigned to 
them is sold. R. 174 Generally speaking, however, if a demon-
strator runs out of product, Tasters or the broker makes an 
effort to provide the demonstrator with enough product to keep 
on working until the time for the demonstration is over. R. 216, 
233 The demonstration is considered complete when the time 
set for the demonstration is over, not when the product is all 
sold. 
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Some demonstrators have delegated assignments to other dem-
onstrators when the original demonstrator does not want to or 
can't do the demonstration he or she is assigned to do, and they 
are then paid for the work. R. 152 Other demonstrators, however, 
call Tasters to provide a replacement when they can not complete 
a demonstration. R. 170, 171 
The demonstrators and Tasters are free to terminate their 
relationship with each other at any time. If Tasters has not 
paid an individual a paycheck for over a year, that individual's 
name is automatically dropped off Tasters 1 computer list of 
available demonstrators. R. 231 
Although they are free to perform services for other employ-
ers, none of the demonstrators advertise, maintain offices or 
obtain business licenses. R. 167 
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broad grant of discretion in deciding which factors have any 
significant weight in a particular factual setting, and which do 
not. 
Utah case law overwhelmingly supports the proposition that 
where the Industrial Commission is required to apply its own 
statutory provisions to the facts before it, as in this case, a 
reviewing court will grant deference to that application and 
apply the reasonableness standard of review. The reviewing 
court in those cases will affirm determinations that are reason-
able and rational. 
The Board of Review's determination in this matter is rea-
sonable and rational. Grouping the 20 factors of the 35-4-22(j) 
(5) test into four categories as the Board did (see Appendix E, 
Decision of the Board of Review) was both appropriate and effi-
cient, and contributed to a better understanding of the basis for 
the Board's final determination. The Board's weighing of factors 
and granting significance to certain factors was also reasonable 
and rational given the requirements of §35-4-22(j)(5) and the 
facts of the case. The Board's determination that certain factors 
were not applicable was entirely in keeping with its statutory 
responsibi1ity. 
Moreover, the Board's findings of fact were complete and 
thorough, each based on substantial evidence in light of the 
whole record as required by the Administrative Procedures Act. 
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Finally, applying the findings of fact against those of the 
20 factors that are applicable, given the nature of Tasters 1 
business, the weight of the evidence shows that its demonstrators 
are employees within the meaning of §35-4-22(j ) ( 5 ) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE BOARD'S ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION OF SECTION 
35-4-22(j)(5)(A) THROUGH (T) WAS REASONABLE. 
A. THE CLEAR LANGUAGE OF SECTION 35-4-22(j)(5) 
GIVES THE BOARD DISCRETION IN MAKING A DETER-
MINATION OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS. 
Section 35-4-22(j)(5) provides in part: 
(j)(5) Services performed by an individual 
for wages or under any contract of hire, 
written or oral, express or implied, are con-
sidered to be employment subject to this 
chapter, unless it is shown to the satisfac-
tion of the commission that the individual is 
an independent contractor. The commission 
shall analyze all the facts in Subsections 
(A) through (T) under the common-law rules 
applicable to the employer-employee relation-
ship to determine if an individual is an 
independent contractor. An individual is an 
independent contractor if the weight of the 
evidence supports that finding. The follow-
ing factors are to be considered if appli-
cable: 
According to the wording of the statute, all individuals who 
enter into agreement to perform services for wages are presumed 
to be employees. The reason for this presumption rests in the 
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underlying objective of the Utah Employment Security Act: to 
provide financial stability to the economy itself and to workers 
who lose their jobs through no fault of their own. (See §35-4-2, 
Utah Employment Security Act.) For the beneficent results of 
the Act to be accomplished, the overwhelming majority of workers 
must be covered by the Act. Therefore, for purposes of the Act, 
the employer-employee relationship, the one covered by the Act, 
is presumed unless it is shown "to the satisfaction of the com-
mission" that another working relationship exists. 
While §35-4-22(j ) (5) gives considerable guidance to the 
Commission with its 20 point test to make determinations regard-
ing independent contractor status, the Commission is also given 
latitude under the statute to weigh the importance of, analyze, 
and determine the applicability of the 20 elements of the test. 
In the matter before this Court, it is clear from the stat-
ute itself that the Legislature considered the Industrial Commis-
sion as the body in the best position of expertise to give effect 
to the regulatory objective to be achieved. A detailed analysis 
of the statute clearly demonstrates the deference intended by 
the Legislature to the Commission's expertise in the following 
phrases: 
1. An individual is an employee unless it is shown to the 
satisfaction of the Commission that the individual is an indepen-
dent contractor. (Emphasis added.) 
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The Commission is given broad latitude by this statement. 
"[S]hown to the satisfaction" is a subjective construction, 
giving the Commission a wide degree of latitude in its task as 
arbiter of questions of independent contractor status. 
2. "The Commission shall analyze all of the facts in Sub-
sections (A) through ( T ) . " 
This phrase is problematic in that the Commission is guided 
to "analyze the facts in Subsections (A) through ( T ) " when (A) 
through (T) are not factual statements at all, but are guidelines 
against which particular fact situations are to be measured. 
Strictly speaking, therefore, the phrase itself does not make 
perfect sense and so requires some interpretation. 
Tasters points to this phrase, particularly the word "all", 
and claims it means that the Board must make three express fac-
tual findings for each of the subsections (A) through ( T ) . First, 
a finding as to the applicability of the factor; second, findings 
regarding facts tending to show or not show independent contrac-
tor status; and third, findings regarding facts tending to show 
employee status. This construction, requiring at least 60 express 
factual findings, is uncomfortable and strained, both from a 
straightforward reading of the statute and from a practical, 
programmatic point of view. The Petitioner's Brief itself is the 
best evidence of how unwieldy, cumbersome and ultimately confusing 
such an analysis would be. The (A) through (T) factors are not 
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the tidy 20 distinctly separate tests Petitioner suggests, but 
are factors developed at common law as sometimes probative in 
determining independent contractor status. As such, the factors 
are somewhat overlapping and repetitive, and should be given con-
sideration only when they apply to a particular fact situation. 
Petitioner cites Williams v. Mountain States Tel, and Tel., 
763 P.2d 796 (Utah 1988) as the lynch pin for its argument that 
each and every factor referenced in the applicable statute be 
expressly considered by the Board. In Wi11i ams the Utah Court 
of Appeals reversed and remanded findings of fact made by the 
Public Service Commission, because the Commission had found 
factors listed in the statute were irrelevant to its findings. 
The Court reversed the Commission's findings that certain factors 
were irrelevant because the Legislature had specifically deter-
mined that those factors were relevant and it was not within the 
Commission's authority to find otherwise. 
The applicable language of the statute in Wi11iams is mark-
edly different from §35-4-22(j)(5) and reads as follows: 
The commission (Public Service Commission) 
shall consider all relevant factors, in-
cluding, but not limited to: [factors (a) 
through ( k ) ] . 
The Public Service Commission is instructed with mandatory lan-
guage that they "shall" consider all relevant factors, including 
but not limited to certain factors determined by the Legislature 
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to be relevant. The factors named at §35-4-22(j)(5) , on the 
other hand, are not mandatory, but are suggested for consider-
ation, if applicable. It is clear then that Wi 11 iams has no 
bearing in this case in the way described by Tasters. 
3. An individual is an independent contractor if the weight 
of the evidence supports that finding. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "weight of evidence" as: 
The balance or preponderance of evidence; the 
inclination of the greater amount of credible 
evidence, offered in a trial, to support one 
side of the issue rather than the other. 
It is up to the trier or reviewer of facts (the Commission 
in this case) to take all of the evidence and weigh it to deter-
mine whether one conclusion or another should be reached. This 
is not the neat mathematical process outlined by Tasters, but a 
more subjective one, based on credible evidence. 
Petitioner claims that §35-4-22(j) (5) gives the Board no 
guidance as to how to weigh the 20 factors, but then proceeds to 
insist, with no statutory authority whatever, that each of the 
factors have exactly equal mathematical weight. In fact, while 
the statute does not say how the 20 factors are to be weighted, 
it is more than clear that the Commission's task is to decide 
their weight in particular fact situations. (See Annotation: 
37 A.L.R. Fed. 95.) 
4. "The following factors are to be considered, if appli-
cable." 
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Petitioner argues the Board must make a specific, express 
finding regarding the applicability of each and eyery one of the 
20 factors and the factual basis for that finding. This enormous 
burden was surely never intended by the Legislature as it is 
clear that if a factor is not discussed in detail it is because 
the Board has found no substantial evidence to indicate the 
factor is applicable in reaching a determination of independent 
contractor status. 
B. UTAH CASE LAW OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTS THE 
PROPOSITION THAT A DETERMINATION OF INDEPEN-
DENT CONTRACTOR STATUS BY THE INDUSTRIAL COM-
MISSION IS NOT A QUESTION OF LAW BUT ONE OF 
MIXED LAW AND FACT. 
There are essentially three standards that determine the 
scope of judicial review of agency action. See Utah Department 
of Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 
601, 608-12 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) . The correction-of-error standard, pro-
posed by the Petitioner as the appropriate standard to be applied 
to this issue, applies to agency rulings on issues of law and 
extends no deference to agency rulings. An agency's findings of 
fact, however, are accorded substantial deference and will not be 
overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if another con-
clusion from the evidence is permissible. As to questions of 
mixed law and fact, however, a reviewing in court will accord an 
agency decision some deference. The agency's decision on those 
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matters will not be set aside unless the agency's conclusion is 
unreasonable. 
In Bennett v. The Industrial Commission, 726 P.2d 427, 429 
(Utah 1986) the Court stated: 
We do not defer to the commission when con-
struing statutory terms to the facts unless 
the construction of the statutory language 
or application of the law to the facts 
should be subject to the commission's exper-
tise gleaned from its accumulated practical, 
first-hand experience with the subject mat-
ter. 
Not only the language of the statute itself, but the uncon-
trovertable weight of judicial authority is that the matter before 
the Court is a mixed question of law and fact, subject to the 
intermediate standard of review. 
The applicable standard of review in matters where the Board 
is to interpret its own operative provisions is clearly the 
standard of reasonableness or rationality or the intermediate 
standard. Virtually all cases have applied the intermediate 
reasonable and rational standard established in Utah Department 
of Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission, supra, 
to the Industrial Commission's interpretation and application 
of operative provisions of the Employment Security Act and 
Worker's Compensation statutes. 
Adele's Housekeeping v. Department of Employment Security, 
757 P.2d 480 (Utah App. 1 9 8 8 ) , was a case brought before this 
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Court on the issue of whether housekeepers were independent con-
tractors or employees under §35-4-22(j)(5) which at the time had 
the AB two-part test rather than the 20 factor test. In Adele 1s 
this Court was clear in holding that the question of independent 
contractor status was one of mixed law and fact: 
We defer to the Board's interpretation and 
application of the operative provisions of 
the Employment Security Act so long as the 
Board's decision is reasonable and rational, 
i.e., the findings of fact support the 
Board ' s conclusion . 
Id. at 482. 
In a footnote to that statement, this Court recognized that 
while the Court in the Bennett case (J_d.) applied a correction-
of-error standard to the issue of independent contractor status 
vs. employer-employee status, Bennett was clearly erroneous on 
that point. It is clear, therefore, that independent contractor 
status issues are subject to the reasonableness standard on re-
view. 
C. THE COMMISSION'S APPLICATION OF SECTION 35-4-
22(j)(5) WAS REASONABLE AND RATIONAL. 
The 20 factor test is not an easy one to apply. Many factors 
are named for possible consideration in the statute because those 
factors have arisen at common law through attempts to get at spe-
cific fact situations that have come before various courts. 
Clearly, though, no one fact situation is measurable against 
15-
every one of the 20 factors. In any fact situation some factors 
would clearly apply, some would clearly not apply, and a possi-
bility entirely ignored by Tasters, some would have minor appli-
cation. 
For example, Factor (K) which asks "whether the individual 
submits no reports or is required to submit regular oral or 
written reports to the employer" is clearly applicable to this 
fact situation. The demonstrators do submit reports to Tasters 
at the end of each demonstration. Although Tasters argues that 
these reports are not for Tasters 1 benefit but for the benefit 
of its brokers, it is explicit in the record that in order to pay 
the demonstrators, Tasters needs to have some proof that the 
demonstration was in fact completed, something they are able to 
verify by a report. The form also leaves room for the store 
manager to comment on a demonstrator's performance. This infor-
mation is also useful to Tasters in assigning further jobs to 
demonstrators. Tasters and the Board differ as to what they 
think the factual information implies, but clearly Factor (K) 
is applicable to the case at hand. 
Factor (I) on the other hand, which asks "whether the indi-
vidual uses his or her own office, desk, telephone, or other 
equipment or is physically within the employer's direction and 
supervision" has little if any bearing on determining independent 
contractor status in the present fact situation. This factor 
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deals with whether or not the individual works in a place of 
business provided by the employer or works in his own place of 
business. In this particular situation there is no work site 
for demonstrators owned or operated by Tasters. Neither is there 
any work site owned or managed by the demonstrator. (To call a 
d e m o n s t r a t o r s home, where phone calls are made to solicit or 
accept work, a place of business is ludicrous.) In this situa-
tion, the work site is the store where the demonstration is done. 
Therefore, the factor has no application to the facts at hand and 
offers no insight into an independent contractor status determin-
at i on. 
Factor (N) asks "whether the individual furnishes his or her 
own tools or is furnished tools and materials by the employer." 
This factor is one of minor significance, since while the demon-
strators furnish their own "tools", those "tools" are not the 
kind associated with an independent business venture. The demon-
strators purchase, have and use "the tools of their trade" mostly 
for personal use in their own homes. In fact, it is something of 
a stretch to even call fry pans and card tables "tools". There-
fore, while Factor (N) is one that applies and incidentally does 
show independent contractor status, it is of marginal significance 
in making the determination of independent contractor status for 
the demonstrators. 
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While Tasters disputes the Board's naming one factor as more 
significant than others, and claims this to be error on the part 
of the Board, it is clear that the Legislature understood that 
the only rational and reasonable way to approach the 20 point 
test is to acknowledge that some factors apply to the situation 
more than others and that, therefore, some are more signficant 
than others. 
The Board in this case further dealt with the reality of the 
variable applicability of the 20 factors by grouping the 20 
factors into four categories (see Appendix E ) , a process which 
made its decision more understandable and manageable than it 
otherwise would have been. This is a reasonable and rational way 
to handle the 20 factor test, although clearly not the only way. 
Tasters does not dispute the rationality of the grouping them-
selves, only that there is no statutory authority for lumping 
any of the factors together. Again, while the statute does not 
expressly endorse this kind of a grouping, the grouping is clear-
ly reasonable and rational and therefore should be upheld on 
review as an appropriate way to apply §35-4-22(j)(5). 
POINT II 
THE BOARD'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE COMPLETE AND 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN LIGHT OF THE 
WHOLE RECORD. 
In describing its standard of review of an agency's find-
ings of fact, this Court held: 
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• . . It is clear that the Board's findings 
of fact will be affirmed if they are "sup-
ported by substantial evidence when, viewed 
in light of the whole record before the 
Court." . . . 
Substantial evidence is "more than a mere 
scintilla of evidence . . . though something 
less than the weight of the evidence." Sub-
stantial evidence is such relevant evidence 
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 
to support a conclusion. 
Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, at 67 & 68 (Utah 
App. 1 9 8 9 ) . 
Tasters frames its factual dispute with the Board in two 
main arguments: 
1. The Board did not make findings of fact that were clearly 
relevant under certain factors; and 
2. The Department made one-sided findings of fact on some 
factors by examining only those facts showing employer-employee 
status and ignoring the independent contractor portion of the 
factor. 
The Board's findings of fact are not, however, significantly 
different from those proposed by Tasters. Tasters' arguments 
about the Board's findings of fact, when examined under the exam-
ples described in their brief, go more to the weight the Board 
gave to certain evidence rather than whether crucial, relevant 
facts were not made part of the findings of fact. 
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For instance, Tasters points to the Board's treatment of 
Factor ( 0 ) , claiming the Board "conveniently ignores the second 
portion of this factor". Demonstrators, all parties agree, bring 
their own fry pans, utensils and card tables to each demonstra-
tion. Factor (0) directs the Board to consider, if applicable 
"whether the individual has a real, essential and adequate invest-
ment in the business or has a lack of investment and depends on 
the employer for such facilities." This factor has little appli-
cability from either side of the equation. Bringing a fry pan 
and a card table you already own to work with you does not con-
stitute "a real, essential and adequate investment" in a business 
by any stretch of the imagination. The fact that demonstrators 
do not rely on Tasters to provide their card tables and fry pans 
does not suddenly make them independent contractors, nor does it 
make the factor a significant one. 
Factor (I) requires the Board to consider, if applicable, 
"whether the individual uses his or her own office, desk, tele-
phone, or other equipment or is physically within the employer's 
direction or supervision." 
The facts pertaining to this factor are not at issue. Demon-
strators do demonstrations at stores not owned or operated by 
Tasters. The applicability of this factor has already been dis-
cussed above, with the conclusion that in terms of equipment or a 
locus of employment, this factor is not applicable because neither 
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the individual demonstrators or Tasters owns, operates or manages 
the site where work is performed. 
Factor (M) requires the Board to consider, if applicable, 
"whether the individual accounts for his or her own expenses or 
is paid by the employer for expenses." While there is no major 
factual dispute between Tasters and the Board as to how inciden-
tal expenses are covered, as claimed by Tasters, the parties 
differ on the weight they grant to the facts illuminated by 
applying the factor. Demonstrators either are provided inciden-
tal supplies (such as toothpicks, napkins, cups) by the store or 
broker, or submit costs to Tasters who acts as conduit for brokers 
in reimbursing the demonstrators. It is Tasters, however, who 
has the right to approve or disapprove questionable costs--not 
the broker. 1 
1
 The employer witness, Cohn, testified on page 215 of the 
record: "We were demonstrating tortillas that were simply to be 
warmed in a fry pan and lightly buttered, cut into serving pieces 
and sampled; and I got a call from a demonstrator in Kemmerer, 
Wyoming, who said she had used peanut butter and jelly and was 
concerned, would she get her supply money back; and we had talked 
about it and I said, 'Well, did you sell tortillas? 1 and she said 
nobody would buy them because people in Kemmerer didn't know about 
tortillas at that time, but she decided to make peanut butter and 
jelly sandwiches and then she sold out; and we just kind of laugh-
ed about it and I said, 'I'm sending the bill. Of course, you'll 
get paid, why not?', but it's a yery simple kind of a situation. 
What works for you, do it; and if you're successful, that's all 
we want is a successful demonstration for our store, for our 
client. The demonstrator wants to do a good job generally." 
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The point is, that demonstrators do not pay their own ex-
penses, but are reimbursed. Even if Tasters ultimately does not 
shoulder those costs, Tasters is the body to which the demon-
strators go to get reimbursed and the entity they must convince 
they are entitled to reimbursement. Facts examined under this 
factor show employee status. 
POINT III 
TASTERS 1 DEMONSTRATORS ARE EMPLOYEES UNDER SECTION 
35-4-22(j)(5)(A) THROUGH ( T ) . 
The following factors are clearly applicable and significant 
under the factual situation presented by Tasters 1 demonstrators. 
Facts examined against these factors tend to indicate employee 
status. 
1. Factor (B) asks "whether the individual uses his or her 
own methods and requires no specific training from the purchaser, 
or is trained by an experienced employee working with him or her, 
is required to take correspondence or other courses, attend meet-
ings, and by other methods indicates that the employer wants the 
services performed". While Tasters does not make the classroom 
or seminar training it provides mandatory, Tasters does provide 
orientation training and specific product training for those 
demonstrators who want it. Tasters argues that since the brokers 
pay for this training, they (Tasters) do not provide training. 
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Tasters also claims that since training is not mandatory, this 
shows the demonstrators are independent skilled workers who bring 
their own special previously honed techniques to their demonstra-
tions. Both of these arguments are without merit. If demonstra-
tors do not need a great deal of training it is because the work 
required of them is so risk free, simple, and non-technical that 
anyone can do it either without instruction or with only the in-
struction Tasters provides in writing (and these written instruc-
tions are certainly part of the demonstrator's training. In the 
case of special new products, training is provided by T a s t e r s -
Tasters is the provider and organizer even though a broker pays 
for the training. It is clear, therefore, that analyzed under 
this factor, Tasters 1 demonstrators are employees. 
2. Factor (C) asks "whether the individual's services are 
independent of the success or continuation of a business or are 
merged into the business where success and continuation of the 
business depends upon those services and the employer coordinates 
work with the work of others". Tasters' argument that its busi-
ness relies not so much on demonstrators but on the brokers who 
provide the money to hire the demonstrators is ludicrous. Tasters 
is not in the business of taking brokers' money, but in the busi-
ness of providing demonstrators. The success and continuation 
of Tasters depends upon individual demonstrators doing their 
jobs. The whole point of Tasters' business is to coordinate the 
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work of its individual demonstrators. This factor strongly 
indicates employee status for the demonstrators. 
3. Factor (G) asks "whether the individual establishes his 
or her own time schedule or does the employer set the time sched-
ule". While Tasters argues that the facts show demonstrators set 
their own time schedule, in fact, it is the store managers who 
set the demonstrators 1 time schedule with regard to the hours to 
be worked (this is based entirely on the hours when customers 
will be in the s t o r e ) , and Tasters who gives suggestions regard-
ing breaks and lunch periods. Tasters argues that demonstrators 
negotiate their own hours, but individual demonstrators did not 
testify to this fact. Their testimony clearly shows they go to 
work at the time communicated to them by Tasters. While Tasters 
may not set these time frames, Tasters allows the brokers and 
store managers to make this decision vis-a-vis its employees. 
What is clear is that the individual demonstrators do not set 
thei r own hours. 
4. Factor (K) asks "whether the individual submits no re-
ports or is required to submit regular oral or written reports to 
the employer". This factor has already been discussed previously 
and is clearly significant in showing employee status of Tasters 1 
demonstrators. 
5. Factor (M) has already been discussed above and is 
significant in indicating employee status. 
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6. Factor (P) asks "whether the individual may realize a 
profit or suffer a loss as a result of services performed or 
cannot realize a profit or loss by making good or poor decisions". 
Tasters argues that individual demonstrators could suffer a loss 
if they were to injure a store patron while on the job or have 
their equipment damaged. Its own witness acknowledges, however, 
that these kinds of losses are ^ery remote possibilities (R. 243) 
and because of the nature of the business would never be signifi-
cant. What Factor (P) is getting at instead of the kinds of 
arguments made by Tasters is whether or not an individual demon-
strator can realize a profit or loss based on the kinds of busi-
ness decisions he or she makes. It is yery clear from the record 
that no matter how the demonstrator runs his or her demonstration, 
it has no effect on his or her eventual pay for the demonstration. 
A demonstrator for Tasters cannot earn any more money by being a 
good demonstrator or less money by being a poor demonstrator. 
For the demonstrator there are in essence no decisions to be 
made. They come, do the demonstration, and go home. This indi-
cates employee status. 
7. Factor (R) asks "whether the individual has his or her 
own office and assistants, holds a business license, is listed in 
business directories, maintains a business telephone, or adver-
tises in newspapers or does not make services available except 
through a business in which he or she has no interest". While 
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the main thrust of the (A) through (T) test is to determine the 
level of direction and control of the employer over the employee, 
Factor (R) and Factor (P) clearly seek information on whether 
or not the individual has his or her own independent business. 
Working part time for several different people in the same line 
of business does not mean that the individual who performs that 
part-time employment has his or her own business, which is the 
argument made by Tasters. There is nothing in the look or nature 
of the kind of work that Tasters 1 demonstrators do nor in the way 
they organize their work to indicate that they have their own 
businesses. Demonstrators work for other people who have busi-
nesses. While there are some who may have set up businesses such 
as Tasters and who have other people work for them, this does not 
mean that all demontrators have established a business. The 
facts applied to this factor clearly show employee status. 
There are two other factors which have minimal applicabil-
ity, but which also indicate employee status: 
1. Factor (A) asks "whether the individual works his or her 
own schedule or is required to comply with another person's 
instructions about when, where, and how work is to be performed". 
This factor has minimal applicability simply because while indi-
vidual demonstrators cannot choose exactly when they will work 
once they have accepted an assignment, they can choose when to 
accept assignments and these facts make it difficult to say 
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whether or not an individual works his or her own schedule. The 
individuals are also required to conform to another person's 
instructions about when, where and how the work is to be perform-
ed in that demonstrators are given instructions from Tasters 1 
brokers and store managers about how they can perform their work. 
The fact that the individuals must comply with another person's 
instructions about work and when they can work, indicates employ-
ee status but because the fact situation is not an easy fit, this 
factor cannot be considered yery significant. 
2. Factor (0) asks "whether the individual has a real, 
essential, and adequate investment in the business or has a lack 
of investment and depends on the employer for such facilities". 
As has already been discussed, this factor has little bearing 
on the matter at hand. Insofar as it is applicable, however, 
this factor weighs in favor of employee status in that it is 
clear that demonstrators do not have any business investment in 
being a demonstrator. Although Tasters argues that the cost of 
the card table, frying pan, and other utensils can add up to 
$200, in point of fact, these items usually are not purchased by 
demonstrators for the purpose of doing demonstrations, but are 
items they already possess before they begin to work for Tasters. 
As a consequence, it is impossible to discuss these items as a 
business investment. While the demonstrators do not depend on 
any kind of investment on the part of Tasters for the use of their 
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facilities, it is clear that under the weight of the evidence of 
this factor, demonstrators would have to fall more into the 
employee portion of the factor. 
There are two factors which are clearly applicable and which 
also tend to indicate independent contractor status: 
1. Factor (L) asks "whether the individual is paid by the 
job or on a straight commission or is paid by the employer in 
regular amounts at stated intervals". It is clear from the facts 
that Tasters 1 demonstrators are paid by the job, that they get 
paid for each demonstration completed and not by a regular pay-
check that comes at a regular interval. Therefore, this factor 
indicates independent contractor status. 
2. Factor (Q) asks "whether the individual works for a num-
ber of persons or firms at the same time or usually works for 
only one employer". While not all of the individuals work for 
other people, many of them do and so this would again indicate 
independent contractor status. 
There are three factors which have minimal applicability, 
but which tend to show independent contractor status: 
1. Factor (D) asks "whether the individual's services may 
be assigned to others or must be rendered personally". There is 
evidence on record of this kind of situation where the demon-
strator's services are assigned to others. However, it is also 
clear from the record that when most of the demonstrators were 
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asked about the possibility of this kind of a procedure, they had 
no idea what the question even meant and that this was not a 
standard practice or a practice that demonstrators even consider-
ed. R. 155, 170 The fact that the witnesses did not know the 
answers to the questions and had to be drawn into answers by 
questions framed in terms of legal conclusions indicates a lack 
of applicability to this fact situation. Nonetheless, when the 
question was understood, it is clear from the record that the 
demonstrator's services could be assigned and therefore this 
factor, while of minimal applicability, does indicate independent 
contractor status. 
2. Factor (H) asks "whether the individual is free to work 
when and for whom he or she chooses, or is required to devote 
full-time to the business of the employer, and is restricted from 
doing other gainful work". This question has minimal applicabil-
ity in that the very nature of Tasters 1 business is that no one 
can devote full time to the business. No full-time work is 
available. As a consequence, this factor has minimal applica-
bility though it would tend to indicate independent contractor 
status in that the individual demonstrators are able to work when 
they desire. 
3. Factor (N) has already been discussed as to why it has 
marginal applicability although it would tend to indicate inde-
pendent contractor status in that the employer provides no tools. 
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Six of the factors are not helpful in determining indepen-
dent contractor status under the facts at hand: 
1. Factor (E) asks "whether the individual has the right to 
hire, supervise, and pay other assistants pursuant to a contract 
under which the individual is responsible only for the attainment 
of a result or the individual hires, supervises, and pays workers 
at the direction of the employer". The record does not show that 
when a demonstrator does get a replacement there is any kind of 
a contract governing the replacement's work. Clearly that kind 
of a transfer of a demonstrator job is not at all what is antici-
pated by Factor (E) anyway, because of the short term and untech-
nical nature of the work involved. Certainly, there are no 
facts indicating demonstrators hire other employees for Tasters. 
2. Factor (F) asks "whether the individual was hired to do 
one job and has no continuous business relationship with the 
person for whom the services are performed or continues to work 
for the same person year after year". This again is not yery 
helpful in that both halves of the factor appear to be true so 
there is no way to give greater weight to either the employee 
portion of the factor or the independent contractor portion of 
the factor. While demonstrators are hired for each individual 
job, a continuous business relationship can also be maintained 
in that the person's name remains on the computer list and the 
individual could continue to work or have an association with 
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Tasters year after year. Therefore analyzing this factor gives 
no useful evidence in determining whether or not a demonstrator 
is an independent contractor or an employee. 
3. Factor (I) asks "whether the individual uses his or her 
own office, desk, telephone, or other equipment or is physically 
within the employer's direction and supervision". This factor 
has already been discussed previously with an explanation as to 
why the factor is inapplicable. 
4. Factor (J) asks "whether the individual is free to per-
form services at his or her own pace or performs services in the 
order or sequence set by the employer". Tasters argues that 
demonstrators are able to perform services at their own pace. 
This makes no sense, however, when all that is required of demon-
strators is that they stand and deliver samples for a certain 
period of time. There is no "pacing", as such, involved in this 
kind of work and there is no ordered sequence of duties because 
of the nature of the work. The task is so simple that to talk 
about order of sequence does not make a great deal of sense. 
Consequently, it is difficult to see this factor as applicable to 
the present fact situation. 
5. Factor (S) asks "whether the individual may not be fired 
or discharged as long as he or she produces a result which meets 
contract specifications or may be discharged at any time". This 
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factor is not applicable simply in that the only contract invol-
ved between Tasters and its demonstrators is the implied agree-
ment that demonstrators will be paid if they hand out samples for 
a set number of hours. To suggest that doing this assigned work 
"produces a result which meets contract specifications" stretches 
the meaning of those words. On the other hand, to talk about 
demonstrators being "discharged at any time" also does not square 
with the evidence since demonstrators are not "discharged" as 
such--only dropped from the list of demonstrators if they do not 
accept jobs often enough. 
6. Factor (T) asks "whether the individual agrees to com-
plete a specific service, and is responsible for its satisfaction 
or is legally obligated to perform the service, or may terminate 
his or her relationship with the employer at any time". Again 
this factor is inapplicable for the same reasons as Factor ( S ) , 
getting to the same kinds of issues. 
It is clear from this factor by factor analysis that the 
overwhelming majority of the nine significant factors fall in 
favor of employee status (seven showing employee status, two 
indicating independent contractor s t a t u s ) . It is also clear that 
five of the factors are of minimum significance and finally that 
six of the factors are simply inapplicable to the case at hand. 
From this analysis it is clear that the weight of the evidence 
shows that Tasters 1 demonstrators are employees as determined 
by the Commission. 
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POINT IV 
THE BOARD CORRECTLY MADE ITS DECISION ON THE BASIS 
OF ITS OWN APPLICATION OF §35-4-22(j)(5) WITHOUT 
REFERENCE TO PREVIOUS INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
DETERMINATIONS, AS REQUIRED BY LAW. 
While acknowledging that an Internal Revenue Service deter-
mination is not binding on Utah courts, Tasters suggests that the 
Board should have given some weight to a previous SS-8 Internal 
Revenue Service ruling which determined Tasters 1 demonstrators to 
be independent contractors. 
The Internal Revenue Service ruling referred to by Tasters 
provided no statement of facts to support its conclusion of 
independent contractor status for Tasters 1 demonstrators. There-
fore, when Tasters requested a ruling on independent contractor 
status of its demonstrators from the Department of Employment 
Security, basic fact finding was done by the Department in an 
effort to give the Department's decision authority. As the facts 
were collected, however, it became obvious that a conclusion 
contrary to the one reched by the Internal Revenue Service was 
appropriate. The Internal Revenue Service ruling was refuted by 
the sworn testimony of witnesses before the Administrative Law 
Judge, which he was bound to consider and which the Commission 
and this Court must also consider. 
Most importantly, however, there is no law, rule, or prece-
dential case suggesting the Commission is bound in any way by a 
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previous decision of the Internal Revenue Service. The Commis-
sion is instead directed to the facts as presented before the 
Administrative Law Judge, to measure them against the 20 factor 
test of §35-4-22(j)(5). 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission's application of §35-4-22(j)(5) 
to the facts of this case was reasonable and rational. The group-
ing of factors into four categories is a reasonable and approp-
riate way of approaching the 20 factor test. The weight of the 
evidence clearly shows that Tasters 1 demonstrators are employees 
as examined under the 20 factor test. 
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of February, 1991. 
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TITLE III. 
REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, COMMIS-
SIONS, AND COMMITTEES 
Rule 14. Review of administrative orders: how obtained; 
intervention. 
(a) Petition for review of order; joint petition. When judicial review by 
the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals is provided by statute of an order 
or decision of an administrative agency, board, commission, committee, or 
officer (hereinafter the term "agency" shall include agency, board, commis-
sion, committee, or officer), a petition for review shall be filed with the clerk of 
the appellate court within the time prescribed by statute, or if there is no time 
prescribed, then within 30 days after the date of the written decision or order. 
The term "petition for review" includes a petition to enjoin, set aside, suspend, 
modify, or otherwise review a notice of appeal or a writ of certiorari. The 
petition shall specify the parties seeking review and shall designate the re-
spondents) and the order or decision, or part thereof, to be reviewed. In each 
case, the agency shall be named respondent. The State of Utah shall be 
deemed a respondent if so required by statute, even though not so designated 
in the petition. If two or more persons are entitled to petition for review of the 
same order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they 
may file a joint petition for review and may thereafter proceed as a single 
petitioner. 
(b) Statutory and docketing fees. At the time of filing any petition for 
review, the party obtaining the review shall pay to the clerk of the appellate 
court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee for docketing 
the appeal. The clerk shall not accept a petition for review unless the filing 
and docketing fees are paid. 
(c) Service of petition. A copy of the petition for review shall be served by 
the petitioner on the named respondent(s), upon all other parties to the pro-
ceeding before the agency, and upon the Attorney General of Utah, if the state 
& a party, in the manner prescribed by Rule 3(e). The petitioner, at the time of 
Sling the petition for review, shall also file with the clerk of the appellate 
xmrt a certificate reflecting service upon all parties to the agency proceeding 
who have been served. 
(d) Intervention. Any person who seeks to intervene in a proceeding under 
this rule shall serve upon all parties to the proceeding and upon all parties 
who participated before the agency, and file with the clerk of the appellate 
court a motion for leave to intervene. The motion shall contain a concise 
rtatement of the interest of the moving party and the grounds upon which 
intervention is sought. A motion for leave to intervene shall be filed within 40 
days of the date on which the petition for review is filed. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administra-
tive Law § 553 et seq. 
AX.R. — Court review of bar examiners' de-
cision on applicant's examination, 39 A.L.R.3d 
T19. 
Standing of civic or property owners' associa-
tion to challenge zoning board decision (as ag-
grieved party), 8 A.L.R.4th 1087. 
Standing of znnina Knar/1
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lar body to appeal reversal of its decision, 13 
A.L.R.4th 1130. 
Judicial review of administrative ruling af-
fecting conduct or outcome of publicly regu-
lated horse, dog, or motor vehicle race, 36 
A.L.R.4th 1169. 
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Utah 
Employment Security Act 
Chapter 35-4 
35-4-1 Short Title. 
This chapter is known as the "Employment Security Act." 
35-4-2 Public Policy. 
As a guide to the interpretation and application of this act, the public 
policy of this state is declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due to 
unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the 
people of this state. Unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest 
and concern which requires appropriate action by the Legislature to 
prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now so often falls with 
crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family. The achieve-
ment of social security requires protection against this greatest hazard of 
our economic life. This objective can be furthered by operating free public 
employment offices in affiliation with a nation-wide system of employment 
services, by devising appropriate methods for reducing the volume of 
unemployment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods 
of employment from which benefits may be paid for periods of unemploy-
ment, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social 
consequences of unemployment. The Legislature, therefore, declares that 
in its considered judgment the public good, and the general welfare of the 
citizens of this state require the enactment of this measure, under the police 
power of the state, for the establishment and maintenance of free public 
employment offices and for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment 
reserves to be used for the benefit of unemployed persons. 
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35-4-22 
Localized Service Defined. 
(j) (4) Service is considered to be localized within a state if: 
(j) (4) (A) the service is performed entirely within the state; or 
(j) (4) (B) the service is performed both within and without the state, 
but the service performed without the state is incidental to the individual's 
service within the state, for example, is temporary or transitory in nature or 
consists of isolated transactions. 
ABC Test of Employment. 
(j) (5) Services performed by an individual for wages or under any 
contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied, are considered to be 
employment subject to this chapter, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of 
the commission that the individual is an independent contractor. The 
commission shall analyze all of the facts in Subsections (A) through (T) 
under the common-law rules applicable to the employer-employee relation-
ship to determine if an individual is an independent contractor. An individual 
is an independent contractor if the weight of the evidence supports that 
finding. The following factors are to be considered if applicable: 
(j) (5) (A) whether the individual works his or her own schedule, or is 
required to comply with another person's instructions about when, where, 
and how work is to be performed; 
(j) (5) (B) whether the individual uses his or her own methods and 
requires no specific training from the purchaser, or is trained by an 
experienced employee working with him or her, is required to take 
correspondence or other courses, attend meetings, and by other methods 
indicates that the employer wants the services performed; 
(j) (5) (C) whether the individual's services are independent of the 
succsess or continuation of a business, or are merged into the business 
where success and continuation of the business depends upon those 
services and the employer coordinates work with the work of others; 
0) (5) (D) whether the individual's services may be assigned to others, 
or must be rendered personally; 
(j) (5) (E) whether the individual has the right to hire, supervise, and 
pay other assistants pursuant to a contract under which the individual is 
responsible only for the attainment of a result, or the individual hires, 
supervises, and pays workers at the direction of the employer; 
(j) (5) (F) whether the individual was hired to do one job and has no 
continuous business relationship with the person for whom the services are 
performed, or continues to work for the same person year after year; 
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(j) (5) (G) whether the individual establishes his or her own time 
schedule, or does the employer set the time schedule; 
(j) (5) (H) whether the individual is free to work when and for whom he 
or she chooses, or is required to devote full-time to the business of the 
employer, and is restricted from doing other gainful work; 
0) (5) (0 whether the individual uses his or her own office, desk, 
telephone, or other equipment, or is physically within the employer's 
direction and supervision; 
(j) (5) (J) whether the individual is free to perform services at his or 
her own pace, or performs services in the order or sequence set by the 
employer; 
(j) (5) (K) whether the individual submits no reports, or is required to 
submit regular oral or written reports to the employer; 
(j) (5) (L) whether the individual is paid by the job or on a straight 
commission, or is paid by the employer in regular amounts at stated 
intervals; 
0) (5) (M) whether the individual accounts for his or her own 
expenses, or is paid by the employer for expenses; 
(j) (5) (N) whether the individual furnishes his or her own tools, or is 
furnished tools and materials by the employer; 
0) (5) (O) whether the individual has a real, essential, and adequate 
investment in the business, or has a lack of investment and depends on the 
employer for such facilities; 
0) (5) (P) whether the individual may realize a profit or suffer a loss as 
a result of services performed, or cannot realize a profit or loss by making 
good or poor decisions; 
G) (5) (Q) whether the individual works for a number of persons or 
firms at the same time, or usually works for only one employer; 
0) (5) (R) whether the individual has his or her own office and 
assistants, holds a business license, is listed in business directories, 
maintains a business telephone, or advertises in newspapers, or does not 
make services available except through a business in which he or she has no 
interest; 
(j) (5) (S) whether the individual may not be fired or discharged as 
long as he or she produces a result which meets contract specifications, or 
may be discharged at any time; and 
(j) (5) (T) whether the individual agrees to complete a specific service, 
and is responsible for its satisfaction or is legally obligated to perform the 
service, or may terminate his or her relationship with the employer at any 
time. 
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(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this 
section. 
History: C. 1953,63-46b-15, enacted by L. according to the standards of Subsection 
1987, ch. 161, 5 271; 1988, ch. 72, 5 25- 63-46b-16(4r at the end in Subsection (ixa) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- and made minor stylistic changes, 
ment, effective April 26, 1988, deleted "except Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161 
that final agency action from informal a^ judi- § 315 makeg the act effective on January i' 
cative proceedings based on a record shall be 1988. J • 
reviewed by the district courts on the record 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Function of district court the district court will no longer function as in* 
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final termediate appellate court except to review in-
agency decisions through formal adjudicative formal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursu. 
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Su- ant to Subsection (l)(a) of this section. In re 
preme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law, 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
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(0 the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
imphed by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L. appellate court" in Subsection (2)(a); and sub-
1967, ch. 161, i 272; 1988, ch. 72, 5 28. stituted "appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
Xmendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- pellate court" for "Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
pent, effective April 25,1988, substituted "As cedure" in Subsections (2)(a) and (2Kb). 
Kvided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
irt of Appeals" for 'The Supreme Court or §
 3 1 5 m ake 8 the act effective on January 1, 
itber appellate court designated by statute in
 1 9 83 
gubsection (1); inserted "with the appropriate 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
function of district court trict court will no longer function as intermedin 
Subsection (1) provides that all final agency ate appellate court except to review informal 
decisions through formal adjudicative proceed- adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to 
fogs will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme § 63-46b-15(l)(a). In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 
Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, the dis- (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the 
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap-
pellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the 
extent expressly authorized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are re-
viewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-17, enacted by LN § 315 makes the act effective on January 1, 
1987, ch. 161, S 273. 1988. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
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(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge 
by majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties 
of a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial 
Council 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme 
Court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L. fice of a judge of the Court of Appeals is 6 years 
1986, ch. 47, t 45; 1988, ch. 248, { 7. and until a successor is appointed and ap-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- proved under Section 20-1-7.1," into the 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection present third and fourth sentences and made 
(1), divided and rewrote the former third sen- minor stylistic changes, 
tence, which read 'Thereafter, the term of of-
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(0 appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
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(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3t enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, i 46; 1987, ch. 161, t 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, « 1; 1988, ch. 210, 5 141; 1988, ch. 
248, 5 8; 1990, ch. 80, i 5; 1990, ch. 224,5 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment by ch. 73, effective April 25, 1988, in-
serted subsection designations (a) and (b) in 
Subsection (1); inserted "resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings'* in Subsection (2)(a); 
substituted "state agencies" for "state and local 
agencies" in Subsection (2)(a); substituted "in-
formal adjudicative proceedings of the agen-
cies" for "them" in Subsection (2)(a); deleted 
"notwithstanding any other provision of law" 
at the end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted Subsec-
tion (b); redesignated former Subsections (2Kb) 
to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); added 
"except those from the small claims depart-
ment of a circuit court" at the end of Subsec-
tion (2)(d); and made minor stylistic changes. 
The 19813 amendment by ch. 210, effective 
April 25,1988, added Subsection (2)(h) and re-
designated former Subsection (2)(h) as Subsec-
tion (2)(i). 
The 1988 amendment by ch. 248, effective 
April 25, 1988, in Subsection (2)(a), rewrote 
the phrase before "except" which had read "the 
ANALYSIS 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
Post-conviction review. 
Scope. 
Cited. 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
The language of Subsection (2)(g) is suffi-
ciently broad to include those cases where a 
criminal conviction is involved in a habeas cor-
pus proceeding challenging extradition. 
Hernandez v. Hayward, 764 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
The Court of Appeals lacked original appel-
late jurisdiction of an appeal from the denial of 
an extraordinary writ involving an interstate 
transfer of a prisoner which bore no relation to 
his underlying criminal conviction, except that 
"but for" the conviction, he would not have 
been incarcerated in Arizona and then trans-
ferred to Utah. Ellis v. DeLand, 783 P.2d 559 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
final orders and decrees of state and local agen-
cies or appeals from the district court review of 
them"; deleted "notwithstanding any other 
provision of law" at the end of Subsection 
(2Xa); inserted present Subsection (2)(b); desig-
nated former Subsections (2)(b) to (2)(h) as 
Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); and substituted 
"first degree or capital felony" for "first or capi-
tal degree felony" in present Subsection (2)(f). 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 80, effective 
April 23, 1990, rewrote Subsection (2)(g), 
which read "appeals from orders on petitions 
for extraordinary writs involving a criminal 
conviction, except those involving a first de-
gree or capital felony" and made punctuation 
changes in Subsections (2)(h) and (3). 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 224, effective 
April 23,1990, inserted the subdivision desig-
nation (i) in Subsection (2)(b) and added Sub-
section (2)(b)(ii), and made related stylistic 
changes. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Cross-References. — Composition and ju-
risdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 
39-6-16. 
Post-conviction review. 
Post-conviction review may be used to attack 
a conviction in the event of an obvious injustice 
or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a con-
stitutional right in the trial. Gomm v. Cook, 
754 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Scope. 
This statute defines the outermost limits of 
appellate jurisdiction, allowing the Court of 
Appeals to review agency decisions only when 
the legislature expressly authorizes a right of 
review. It is not a catchall provision authoriz-
ing the court to review the orders of every ad-
ministrative agency for which there is no stat-
ute specifically creating a right to judicial re-
view. DeBry v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Ap-
peals, 764 P.2d 627 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Cited in Scientific Academy of Hair Design, 
Inc. v. Bowen, 738 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987); In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Nelson: Yes. Yes. If I—if I was busy that weekend, I didn't have to, ah, do 
it; and she would ca—there's her name, Patsy Buckmiller. 
Judge: Okay. Did you ever decline any work? 
Nelson: Yes. 
Judge: Was there any problems when you declined the work? 
Nelson: No. No, there wasn't. 
Judge: Did you work any particular hours? 
Nelson: Ah, ah, yeah, there was. There was either from, let me think. It was 
either from 10 to 5 or 11 to 6 and then sometimes there would only 
have an—an afternoon one, which would usually run about 12 to, ah, 6. 
Judge: Hew were these hours determined? 
Nelson: Ah, let me see. I think it was supposed to be an eight-hour work day 
on, ah, the main day, not the short day, the new one. And, ah, then 
we would get, ah, usually an hour off for lunch. 
Judge: Do you knew who determined these hours? 
Nelson: I assume, ah, it was the grocery store. 
Judge: Why do you assume it was the grocery store? 
Nelson: Vfell, 'cause t—they would, ah, ah, from what I understood, they would 
call Tasters and say they wanted a demonstration done; and I as—so I 
assumed they were the ones that said what the hours were—that they 
wanted the demonstration done. 
Judge: Once you had received the hours you were to be present, were you 
required to be present throughout those scheduled hours? 
Nelson: Yes. 
Judge: Could ycu leave the premises at all during those—during those hours? 
Nelson: Ah, I did not. I do knew like if, ah, I knew one lady she got some 
stuff spilled on her clothes and she had to go heme and change; but 
then, when she came back, she did work, I think it was extra half an 
hour to make up for when she left. 
Judge: Okay. What is the basis of your pay? 
Nelson: Ahm, the basis of my pay. 
7 
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Judge: Are you paid per jobf per hour, oanmission? 
Nelson: It seems like it was per Job. I—it was, let me think. It was—oh, 
look at my papers here, what they were. I think it was $30.00 per 
day, if I rearnember right. 
Judge: And that's for an eight-hour day? 
Nelson: Uh-huh. 
Judge: If you worked, ah, the sh—just the afternoon demonstration, what was 
the basis of your pay? 
Nelson: Ah, new that I donft remember. I remember I did one. Let me see if I 
have that paper here—when I did it. I can't remember. I know it was 
less than $30.00. I remember that; so apparently it must have been on 
an hourly basis; 'cause I do knew that on the short day it was less 
than the—the eight-hour day. 
Judge: Okay. Would anybody visit the demonstration to see what you were 
doing? 
Nelson: Yes. 
Judge: Who would that person be? 
Nelson: That was Patsy Buckmiller and sometimes the other lady \A*IO got me 
started, Dabbie Henry. 
Judge: And vrtiat was the purpose of these visits? 
Nelson: Ah, the first few times was to come and make sure I was doing okay, 
beca—you know, 'cause I had just started; and then the other times 
was to see if there was anything that—that I needed that they could 
go and get for me and to see if, ah, there was enough product to 
demonstrate. 
Judge: Would anybody else check on you? 
Nelson: No. 
Judge: Was there ever occasion where the store manager would check on you? 
Nelson: Ah, he could have, 'cause I knew I saw him a lot. You knew, they— 
they'd walk by, so they could have been checking also. 
Judge: Okay. Would you explain exactly what you do in your demonstrations, 
how—from the beginning to end. 
Nelson: Okay. I would go in and set up my table and, ah, we put the—the 
product out on the table in a display. We had our cooking pans there 
to cook the food if it needed to be cooked; and we would start up the 
8 
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cooking—like, say if it was hot dogs, we'd start cooking them. We'd 
have napkins and, ah, or toothpicks there for the peqple to take i— 
you know, when they took the—the sainple; and we had the saitple set 
out on a plate or sometimes there were individual paper cups that they 
could take the samples and sample them. When the people would walk 
by, I would ask them if they would like a sample and some would say 
yes and some would say no; and I would—when they would sample it, I 
would tell them about the product, hew much it was and if it was on 
sale and if there was anything like no cholesterol or—or you knew, 
important little factors that people would like to knew, hew to fix it 
if they didn't know hew to fix it. 
Judge: Okay. And what would happen at the conclusion of your work? 
Nelson: Ah, I would fold up my table and put it away. Ah, the packages from 
the product I keep in a sack and I would count them and fill out a 
paper that we had that we kept inventory of tdiat we had used and what 
was on the shelves and, ah, then the store manager would have to sign 
it and—or their manager of that departanent would have to sign it and 
okay everything. Ah, I would leave the empty sacks with them so that 
they knew what the count was. If there was any little bit of product 
left over, we was allowed to take that home. 
Judge: Okay. This report that you had indicated where you listed inventory, 
was that just for inventory or was there other information on the 
report? 
Nelson: Let's see. On the report was the name of the product, hew many cases 
there was to begin with, ah, hew many there was after it was over and 
then hew many was used as samples and then they kind of estimated how 
many units were sold because of the demonstration. Ah, let's see, 
what else was on there. The name of the store is on there and, ah, 
ah, **iat the weather was like was on there; and they also had us fill 
out what the people said, comments and th—where the store manager 
signed and also their comments. That—that's basically what was on 
the paper. 
Judge: Okay. Why did you obtain the store manger's signature? 
Nelson: Ah, I don't knew. I assume because it was their store and they had to 
okay the demonstration. I knew before we ever went in to demonstrate, 
we had to call and okay it with them that it was all right that we did 
this demonstration; and then I guess they, ah, it was part of their 
responsibility; and so they needed to sign it and okay it. 
Judge: All right. After you have the report completed, what did you do with 
the report? 
Nelson: I would mail it to Tasters at—let's see. I would—there was two 
copies. I would, ah, give one to the store, the manager of the 
department and then, ah, I would take the other one, if I remember 
right, and send it to Tasters. 
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determined that your work for them was unsatisfactory and they had, 
ah, terminated the relationship, would you feel that they would have 
had any liability as far as you were concerned? 
Nelson: I don't think so. 
Levanger: Okay. That's all the questions I have. 
Judge: Counsellor, do you have sane questions? 
Doctorman: I do. Beverly, my name is Gary Doctorman. I'm an attorney and 
represent Tasters, Inc. I—I will have a few questions for you. 
Nelson: Okay. 
Doctorman: If Tasters, asked you to, say, go to Provo to do a demonstration, would 
you feel free to turn them dcwn? 
Nelson: Oh, yes. 'Ihey, ah, called and asked me to go to, ah, Castledale one 
day; and I told them no, that I didn't want to travel that far to go 
and do a dlemonstration. 
Doctorman: So would it be true th—then where do you generally perform your 
demonstrations? 
Nelson: I generally do it here in Price. 
Doctorman: Is that your place of choice? 
Nelson: Yes. 
Doctorman: And if Tasters asked you to perform a demonstration at a time that was 
inconvenient to you and you didn't want to perform it at that time, 
would you feel free to turn that dcwn? 
Nelson: Yes. 
Doctorman: And would there be any repercussions for, ah, that? 
Nelson: No, there wasn't. 
Doctorman: So you effectively could select the time and place with which you 
wanted to work by either accepting or rejecting, ah, available 
demonstrations. Is that correct? 
Nelson: Yes. 
Doctorman: Did Taster's ever tell you specifically hew to perform the details of 
your demonstration or were the details left to you to determine? 
Nelson: The details were left to me to determine. 
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Doctontan: You never attended any training session in Salt Lake put on by 
Tasters? Is that correct? 
Nelson: That's right. 
Doctontan: Did Tasters ever tell you that you could not assign your services to 
any other person? 
Nelson: No. 
Doctontan: Did Tasters ever tell you that you could not hire an assistant, if you 
s — 
Nelson: No. 
Doctontan: If, ah, for instance, you had scheduled yourself for a—an all-day 
session and you determined that, after you had scheduled that session, 
that you could only work half that time, would you have considered 
hiring or using someone else to work the other half of that shift? 
Nelson: Yes, we—we did that. Ah, if one of us had to go someplace, ah, they 
would call one of the other ladies that would also do demos, and they 
would come in and fill in for them. 
Doctorman: Did Tasters tell you when you could take lunch breaks? 
Nelson: No, they did not. I knew that we had a lunch break, but they did not 
say at what time we had to take them. 
Doctontan: Did Tasters tell you at what time you could take breaks during the 
day? 
Nelson: No. 
Doctontan: Did Tasters monitor your breaks or your lunch breaks? 
Nelson: Not that I knew of, they didn't. 
Doctontan: And, if you wanted to have left the store at any time for the day, for 
your personal reasons or for an emergency, did you have to report to 
Tasters? 
Nelson: No, I did not. 
Doctontan: Did Tasters have a requirement on the pace of your work? And by that 
I mean hew many people that you contacted in the store, hew—hew many 
products that you demonstrated or get o—or gave out or any o—any of 
those factors? 
Nelson: No, they didn't. 
14 
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Doctontan: And it's clear that Tasters didn't provide any equipment, and you 
provided aill your own equipment. 
Nelson: Yes. I provided al ray own equipment. 
Doctorman: What, ah, do you believe your investment in that equipment to be? 
In dollar figures. 
Nelson: Dollar fiqiures. Ah— 
Doctorman: You can either add it up—however you want to do it. You can do it 
out loud or—wh—piece by piece or as a whole, whatever you'd like to 
do. 
Nelson: Oh, let's see. I had the card table and a table cloth and frying pan, 
utensils. I guess around $40.00, $40.00-$45 00. 
Doctorman: You can buy a card table and frying and utensils for $40.00 in Price? 
Nelson: (laughing) Let me think of it. Card tables are usually $20.00, and 
frying pans are usually around $20.00. New, a table cloth would 
probably run around $5.00. I guess it would be more than $40.00. 
Doctorman: Okay. 
Nelson: Probably, ah, between 45 and—probably more like $50.00. 
Doctorman: All right. Do you knew whether Tasters used the, ah, document that 
you submitted to them for their cwn internal purposes. Do you knew 
why they use that document that you sent to them at the end of the 
day? 
Nelson: Ah, I a—I assumed— 
Doctorman: I don't want you to assume. 
Nelson: Oh. 
Doctorman: I want you just to tell me whether or not you knew. 
Nelson: I don't knew. 
Doctorman: Okay. Thank you. And do you knew whether or not Tasters was 
rBiitibursed by the food product demonstrator for your expenses? 
Nelson: No, I don't knew. 
Doctorman: If, ah, di—did you fry foods there? 
Nelson: Yes. 
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Doctorman: I'm just looking at my notes here for a second. I'm sorry for the 
delay. 
Nelson: That's okay. 
Doctorman: Who asked you to work with Dynamic Demos? 
Nelson: Ah, Patsy did. 
Doctorman: Okay. This is the same Patsy Buckmiller that also wor—also visited 
you when you were working for Tasters? 
Nelson: Yes. 
Doctorman: Okay. Did—do you knew if you paid Patsy any fee for, whether your 
work was at Tasters or Dynamics? 
Nelson: No. 
Doctorman: You don't knew whether or not a fee was paid? 
Nelson: I don't knew. I don't think I did. As far as I knew, I didn't. 
Doctorman: Okay. And finally, I understood at the—at the end of your 
questioning from the Judge that you understood Tasters to somewhat be 
a middleman between the brokers—the food brokers and yourselves. 
Nelson: Yes. 
Doctorman: let me just shortly consult with my client and see if she has any 
questions, and then I'll— 
I have no further questions, Your Honor. 
Judge: Okay. Thank you. I have one question for clarification here. You 
indicated that if there was a need for you to take time off a 
substitute would be arranged. Did this ever incur to you? 
Nelson: Did I—to, ah— 
Judge: Did you ever have a substitute? 
Nelson: No. Wha—no. Didn't. 
Judge: Okay. Mr. Levanger, any further questions? 
Levanger: No. I do not believe so. 
Judge: All right then. Thank you for your time and we'll excuse you. 
Nelson: Okay. Thank you. 
Judge: Good-bye. 
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Judge: Okay. to you recall entering any—into any, ah, written or oral 
contract? 
Baird: I don't think so. I don't think so. I did get a letter from them 
saying I would be th—ah, s—ah, self-employed, that I'd be liable for 
self-employment tax. Ah,— 
Judge: All right. 
Baird: That's it. 
Judge: Is it my understanding that work you performed then was demonstrating 
food products in grocery stores? 
Baird: Yes. 
Judge: Did you perform any work outside of that parameter? 
Baird: No. No, other than going into meetings in Salt Lake, ah, and being 
paid for that. We received $10.00 for going to instructional meetings 
in Salt Lake, but that's all. Other than that, the only work I did 
for them was in grocery stores. Yes. 
Judge: And hew were you paid for your work you performed in the grocery 
stores? 
Baird: By check. 
Judge: Okay. Were you paid by the day, by the hour? What was the basis? 
Baird: By the day. 
Judge: Hew much were you paid? 
Baird: Ah, it was $5.00 an hour, so it was, ah, we were paid for—well, 
usually I worked th—it was seven hours and i—I was there for eight 
hours, but I had half an hour for lunch and two 15-minute breaks. 
Judge: Hew often would you come to Salt Lake for a meeting? 
Baird: (Si,not very often. Ah, once in—probably once in six months, 
something like that. 
Judge: And what was the purpose for the meeting? 
Baird: Just to shew, ah, just for us to learn the procedure that we needed to 
follow in—in demoing a particular product. 
Judge: And hew would you learn of the meeting? 
Baird: They would go through the— 
Judge: Excuse me, hew did you knew that the meeting was— 
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Judge: Who determined those hours of work? 
Baird: I don't knew. I don't know. They were just, ahm, a information sheet 
I received \tfien I was told where to go and—and \rtiat I was—would be 
demoing and, ah, let's see, Sandi signed it. 
Judge: Okay. Yo—are you saying then that you received some type of 
correspondence in the mail concerning the demonstration? 
Baird: Yes. 
Judge: Okay. What would be in that information you'd receive? 
Baird: I didn't hear you. 
Judge: What would be in that information you would receive from Ms. Cohn? 
Baird: Oh, let's see. I have a saitple here. I'll read it. New this isn't 
signed by anybody. It's from Tasters, Inc., ah, Sandi Cohn, at the 
top of the letterhead: dem—"Demonstration Report", for instance, 
this time I did Albertsons. I was report-to report to a particular 
person and, ah, the times were from 11 to 7 and 10 to 6, ah, on Friday 
and Saturday. From, ah, let's see, **iat else di—was your question? 
Judge: Okay. Ah, that would cover it. 
Baird: Okay. And then on this same for we—we gave back the information of 
hew it went, hew much we sold, that type of thing. 
Judge: Did you complete a report on the conclusion of every demonstration? 
Baird: Yes. 
Judge: And do you knew the reason for the report? 
Baird: It was, ah, for the pr—for the producers or the manufacturers to knew 
hew much was sold and then we also sent a copy in to the main office. 
Judge: To vtfio's main office? 
Baird: Tasters. 
Judge: Okay. Did anybody supervise you while you were performing your 
demonstrations? 
Baird: No. Occasionally one of the girls from the main office, ah, would 
come and—would come by and see hew we were doing and—but we—no, we 
weren't—there wasn't somebody there all the time. 
Judge: Who would come by to visit? 
Baird: I don't really remember the names of the other girls. I think there 
23 
nooiGl 
APPENDIX B (Page 20) 
was a Bonnie and, ah, hm, there were about three, ah; and they just 
cone by to see hew we were doing and—and, ah, help us if there was 
some way they could shew us hew to do it better. 
Judge: Okay. You mentioned they were from the main office. Hew do you know 
they were from the main office? 
Baird: Well, because they worked with Sandi. The/ were there at the meetings 
when—when we had—they were part of the one—they were some of the 
people that shewed us hew to do—hew to demonstrate a product. 
Judge: Okay. Did you furnish your own equipment? 
Baird: Yes. 
Judge: Did Tasters furnish you with anything? 
Baird: Ah, something like a—a microwave or a, ah, or a fry pan, something 
like that; but usually it was my cwn—my cwn equipment, spatulas and— 
and all the things I needed. They furnished us with aprons. We paid 
$10.00 for the aprons and—and, ah, so they sold us those, but, ah, 
no. It was primarily my own equipment. 
Judge: Was there any logo on the apron? 
Baird: Yes, Tasters. 
Judge: Okay. Do you perform this type of work for anybody else? 
Baird: No. Not during the period of time I was working for Tasters. No. 
Judge: Were you free to accept or decline any of the jobs? 
Baird: Yes. 
Judge: Did you receive a questionnaire from the Department? 
Baird: Yes. From—you mean from— 
Judge: From the Department of Employment Security. 
Baird: Yes, I did. 
Judge: Did anyone: instruct you in the manner in which the document was to be 
completed? 
Baird: No. 
Judge: Did you on—answer the, ah, questions honestly in the bes—and to the 
best of your ability? 
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Levanger: 
Baird: 
levanger: 
Baird: 
Levanger: 
Baird: 
Levanger: 
Baird: 
Levanger: 
Baird: 
Levanger: 
Baird: 
Levanger: 
Baird: 
Levanger: 
Baird: 
Doctorman: 
Baird: 
Doctorman: 
During this time, did you have an office? 
No. 
Do you have a business license? 
No. 
Are you listed in any kind of business directories? 
No. 
You don't—do you, ah, maintain a business telephone? 
No. 
Do you advertise in the newspapers? 
No. 
Was there any time during this period of time that, ah, you incurred 
any loss or liability as a result of the type of work that you do? 
Ah, let me think. No. No. 
There was no occasion that you recall, for example, that you may have 
spilled something on a customer or something of that nature, a frying 
pan falling on somebody's toe? 
No. 
Okay. Thank you. That's all the questions I have. Thank's Eve. 
Okay, Counsellor, do you have some questions you'd like to ask? 
Yes, Your Honor. 
Eve, my name is Gary Doctorman; and to clarify the record for the 
Judge, I had thought that I had knewn you. I told him before we 
called, but— 
I can't hear you, Gary. 
I will speak up. I apologize. 
Eve, my name is Gary Doctorman. I'm an attorney. I represent Tasters 
in this hearing, and before the hear—before we called you on the 
telephone, I'd represented to the Judge that I knew you; but after I 
had—just from the name, I think I have a mistaken identity. D—we 
don't knew each other, do we? 
Baird: Ah, no. Not—I don't believe so. 
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Baird: Ah, to see hew sales were going and see hew—i—I—if I were doing the 
job the way it was supposed to be done and to—for optimum sales, ah, 
th—I—and their appearance helped me to do the j—once th—once or 
twice they just, ah, took same of the demo material and—and, ah, 
shewed me~n—didn't shew me how to do it, but just went up to 
customers and—and, ah, I suppose, helped me. 
Doctorman: As a general rule, were you at the store alone or were ydy there with 
a supervisor from Tasters? 
Baird: Alone. 
Doctorman: And it was; only on a couple of occasions that somebody from Tasters 
appeared at the store? 
Baird: Oh, no. No. It was much more than that. I worked for them for, hm, I 
think, what, two years—a year-and-a-half or two years. I don't 
recall. 
Doctorman: Do you knew whether or not the people who appeared at the store were 
directly from Tasters, or were they from the food manufacturers such 
as Proctor and Gamble or Budget Gourmet, things of that nature? 
Baird: They were from Tasters. 
Doctorman: Okay. But the details of the work, the hour-to-hour work, was left to 
you to determine hew to do. 
Baird: Yes, after we were told hew to do it. 
Doctorman: Did Tasters ever tell you that you were—that you had to perform the 
services personally? 
Baird: Oh, no. Why would they do that if they contacted me. They informed 
me by letter of—no. They didn't tell me that I had to do it 
personally; but I wouldn't send my husband to do it. 
Doctorman: Okay. But that would be your decision. Tasters didn't tell you you 
couldn't send your husband to do it, did they? 
Baird: No. 
Doctorman: Did Tasters ever tell you that you did not have the right to hire 
assistants to assist you in your demonstration? 
Baird: No. It di—it never came up. It didn't occur to me. If I am 
supposed to do a job, I do it myself. 
Doctorman: But if, ah, perchance, that you had agreed to take a job and then 
something came up and you could only work half the job, ah, did 
Tasters ever tell you you couldn't hire somebody to do the other half 
of the job? 
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Baird: That didn't come up either. 
Doctorman: Okay. It just wasn't an issue for you then? 
Baird: No. 
Doctorman: All right. That's fine. If a time schedule did not work for you, say 
they—Tasters wanted a demonstration from 12 midnight 'til 6 in the 
morning, you didn't feel you could work at that time, could you turn 
that down? 
Baird: That's hypothetical. I don't, ah, I don't think that's relevant. I — 
it—that never came up, I— 
Doctorman: Okay. If any time schedule was inapprop—or inappropriate because you 
wanted to visit a neighbor or take a vacation, ah, did you feel free 
to turn it down? 
Baird: Ah, yes, I think so. 
Doctorman: Okay. 
Baird: I don't think I turned down very many, but, ah, if any; but I would 
have felt free to, ah, a—to ask them, yes. 
Doctorman: Okay. Did Tasters ever tell you that you had to work only for 
Tasters? 
Baird: Only for Testers? 
Doctorman: Yes. 
Baird: No. 
Doctorman: You were free to work for other people? 
Baird: That's right. 
Doctorman: Okay. What sort of investment did you have in the equipment that you 
purchased? 
Baird: Oh, it was minimum, I think. I paid about $40.00 for the fry pan and 
$10.00 for the apron and, ah, table cloth from time to time. Ah, 
that's about it; and the gas to and from was—sometimes amounted to 
something, but— 
Doctorman: What about the card table? That— 
Baird: Oh, yeah. But that's something—everybody has a card table. That's— 
my husband just put a legs on it and it worked great. 
Doctorman: Okay. And the serving pieces? Ah, were those something that had to 
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Baird: No, it's not. 
Doctorman: Did Tasters set a pace for you? In other words, what I'm asking you, 
did they tell you hew many people to solicit or hew many products to— 
that you had to demonstrate in the course of a day, or was that left 
to you? 
Baird: That was left to me, of course, the more we demonstrated, the more we 
sold? and I tried to sell the very most I could. 
Doctorman: Okay. 
Baird: They—they determined the product and the—and the method of demoing 
and— (inaudible). 
Doctorman: Did Tasters ever tell you you were paid by the hour or did you just 
take the job rate and divide it by the hour? 
Baird: They didn't tell me when to take a break. I would take it when it was 
not as busy, and sometimes I didn't take one at all; so that's—that 
was at my discretion. 
Doctorman: Ah, I th— 
Baird: Told me the hours. They gave me the written time to work, 11 to 7, 10 
to 6, that type of thing. 
Doctorman: Ah, you—this speaker phone may not, ah, be the best, ah, medium and I 
appreciate your answer, but I di—that wasn't the question that I 
asked, an— 
Baird: Oh. 
Doctorman: And so, let me—th—let me just confirm th—the answer that you gave 
was another question I was going to ask, and that was that Tasters 
did not tell you when to take lunch breaks or when to take, ah, any 
other break during the day. Is that correct? 
Baird: That's right. 
Doctorman: And the question that I—that I previously asked was concerning your 
pay. 
Baird: Yes. 
Doctorman: Did yo—you'd said once in your testimony you were paid by the job and 
then at another time you said you were paid by the hour. Did— 
Baird: (inaudible). 
Doctorman: Did you—le—let me just get the question out if I could, please; ah, 
and I—I don't mean to interrupt you, but I—I do have a specific 
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question. Did you take the job rate and divide it by the nuniber of 
hours you worked, cone up with the hourly rate? 
Baird: No. No. They paid me $5.00 an hour. Hcwever, if I sold everything 
that the store had in; and they could not get any more in, then that 
was—that was my job for the day and they paid me for the full day; so 
that's why I—that's why I didn't always work the full—the full 
second day, because I had sold everything out. 
Doctorman: And—and that day you went hone early, but still got a full day—a 
full— 
Baird: Yes. 
Doctorman: —pay. 
Baird: Uh-huh. 
Doctorman: Okay. And was that your understanding, if that occurred on a repeated 
basis, that you would be paid the amount for—for a full-day 
demonstration even though you ran out of product and went home earlier 
in the day? 
Baird: I—that didn't come up until—well, I was delighted when I first did 
that and they paid me for the full amount. 
Doctorman: Okay. 
Baird: I didn't knew that. 
Doctorman: It came up on one occasion then? 
Baird: Oh, on quite a few occasions. Ah, but I didn't knew it until I had 
worked for them—oh, I don't knew, six months or so. 
Doctorman: How many occasions did that occur on? 
Baird: Oh, golly, I have no i—I don't know. 
Doctorman: More than three? 
Baird: Yes. 
Doctorman: Okay. Less than 20? 
Baird: Yes. 
Doctorman: Okay. Neighborh—round—just an estimate of hew many times that you 
ran out of product and were given a full, ah, demonstra—a full fee 
for an entire demonstration day and— 
Baird: I couldn't give an estimate on that. 
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Colmere: With Tasters? 
Judge: Uh-huh. 
Oolinere: Ah, demonstration, selling the product of the broker. 
Judge: All the work you did involved demonstrating products? 
Colmere: Ri#it. 
Judge: Where did you perform the work? 
Colmere: In grocery stores. 
Judge: All the work you performed then was in grocery stores? 
Colmere: Ri#it. 
Judge: Wfere—were you paid by the hour or by the day? What was the basis for 
your pay? 
Colmere: I never figured it as an hourly wage. I just received for the two 
days work that I received, I received the amount of $70.00. 
Judge: Were there occasions where you'd work less than two days? 
Colmere: Sometimes it was just a Saturday job, yes. 
Judge: How much would you get paid for the Saturday job? 
Colmere: $35.00. 
Judge: Hew many hours would ycxi work? 
Colmere: Ah, from 10 to 6, half-an-hour lunch. 
Judge: Who scheduled the hours? 
Colmere: Tasters. 
Judge: And vfriy would the hours be scheduled from 2 to 6? 
Colmere: That usually, in the grocery store, the traffic is the most proainent 
from 10 in the morning until 6 in the afternoon. That is when the 
traffic is more prominent in the grocery store. 
Judge: Could you take more than a half-hour lunch if you decided to do so? 
Colmere: No. 
Judge: Why couldn't you? 
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Colmere: I never thought about it. I always just—half-an-hour lunch. 
Judge: Okay. Who told you you could take a half-an-hour lunch? 
Colmere: Pardon roe? 
Judge: Who told you that you were only afforded a half-an-hour for lunch? 
Colmere: Tasters. 
Judge: Do you recall in particular who the individual was? 
Colmere: No. 
Judge: Okay. 
Colmere: There's many people at Tasters, many girls. 
Judge: Did you ever participate in any training? 
Colmere: No. I was already trained from my previous demonstration job. 
Judge: Did you ever attend any meetings? 
Colmere: When the broker requests an item that he has to put into the grocery 
store that needs specicil attention to sell th—that product, yes. 
Judge: So these meetings would be required by the broker. 
Colmere: Correct. I—I'm selling his product. 
Judge: Okay. Ah, were ycu free to decide vAiether you would attend the 
meeting or not? 
Cblmere: Pardon me? 
Judge Could you decline to go to the meeting if you desired to? 
Colmere: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. If I didn't want to do that product, I didn't 
have to go to the meeting nor do the demonstration. 
Judge: Well, let's say, for instance, you wanted to do the product— 
Colmere: Okay. 
Judge: —but do not want to attend the meeting. 
Colmere: Oh, you don't have to attend the meeting. 
Judge: So you could do the demonstration without— 
Colmere: Right. 
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Judge: —the meeting. 
Colmere: Ri^it. 
Judge: Were you paid while you attended the meeting? 
Colmere: Yes. 
Judge: Hew much were you paid for your attendance? 
Cfclmere: $10.00. 
Judge: What would take place at the meetings? 
Cdlmere: The broker would be there. He would request hew he wanted 
represented, ah, \diat we were to say to present this product, ah, show 
us the product, what the product tastes like. 
Judge: You mentioned here he would tell you what to say. Would they give you 
a dialogue? 
Colmere: Yes. They would—they wanted you to put a presentation of th—the 
product that you're selling to the public, so they'd tell you what to 
say. 
Judge: And this would be the broker? 
Colmere: Uh-huh. 
Judge: Would he verbally tell you or would he give you a written format for 
yo to follow? 
Colmere: Ju—just, you knew, he would—he would tell us what—what he would 
request us to say. We could put it in our own words, but he wanted 
that presentation brought to, you knew— 
Judge: He would give you the general ideas. 
Colmere: Right. 
Judge: Did you furnish anything outside of the frying pan, card table, table 
cloth, utensils and that type of thing? 
Colmere: No. I furnished them. 
Judge: Okay. That would be the extent of the things you would furnish? 
Colmere: Uh-huh. 
Judge: Would Tasters ever furnish you with anything? 
Colmere: A microwave oven if it was needed. 
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Colmere: Hu-uh. 
Judge: Okay. Did you ever incur any particular problems during the course of 
your demonstration that you couldn't handle? 
Colmere: No. But if there was, I would have to take that up with the store 
manager. The—the minute—the way that I see it is, when I walk into 
this grocery store, I have to follow their rules of the way the store 
is run and handled; and I think that that store manager is—does then 
become my boss for the two days that, ah, I am there. If a problem 
should cone up, I ha—I more than likely would take it up with the 
store manger. 
Judge: Okay. What interaction would you have with the store manager? 
Colmere: Well, the—the first thing that I do is I go and ask him where he 
would like me to set up; and he will say here or there; and if there's 
a product, if he'll—if my—if I'm standing beside my product or if 
I'm not, he'll say, "Would you like to go stand by your product or 
would you rather be further away from the product that you're 
demonstrating?" And usually I'll say, "No. I like to be standing 
beside it." And he'll say, "Okay, that's fine. What we'll do is 
we'll just move the product down to where you are standing." And he 
sets it up so I'm right there by the product that I'm demonstrating. 
Ah, if there's anything I—I need, such as maybe a long extension 
cord, which I do not carry. I carry an extension cord, but if I do 
need a long one, then I usually go to the store manager and say, you 
knew, could you find me one or would you help me and— 
Judge: Okay. Vfauld anyone ever assist you in your work? 
Colmere: No. 
Judge: Ah, did you ever have somebody substitute for you? 
Colmere: No. 
Judge: What reports would you complete? 
Colmere: Ah, I'm sent a fact sheet on every job. It would be hew much product 
I have before I started work, hew much product I had for the 
demonstration and hew much product did I sell; and then I would have 
it signed by the store manager. 
Judge: Okay. What was the purpose of having the store manager sign the 
report? 
Colmere: To verify that I was there for the two days. 
Judge: Okay. While performing this work for Tasters, did you do this type of 
work for anybody else? 
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Colmere: No. 
Judge: Did you seek to do it for anybody else? 
Colmere: Yes, they~I have demon—other demonstrators call roe during the week 
to do other jobs; but, ah, I don't like to work with over one; so I 
usually stick with Tasters; because they're good. They're fair to roe, 
and I just stick with Tasters; and yet, I do have other demonstrators 
calling me; but I don't—I don't accept the jobs. 
Judge: Why do you prefer just to be one—be—be with one? 
Oolroere: Because it's more dif—it's difficult to have roore than—than one; 
because then, you knew, you're—you're looking at your date book or 
your calendar and you're figuring out, okay, vrtiich company am I 
working for this weekend, ah, vrtio's paying roe this weekend or, you 
knew, what company am I working for; so I just generally stay with 
Tasters; amd they've been very fair with roe. 
Judge: Have you ever considered going directly to the manufacturers to do the 
demonstration? 
Colmere: No. 
Judge: Mr. Levanger, do you have any questions? 
Levanger: Just a few questions in clarification mostly. I'm John Levanger. I'm 
the individual that sent you that terrible form you had to fill out. 
You indicated earlier that you, ah, from time to time you attended, 
ah, training meetings, ah, with various food brokers in which, ah, at 
vtfiich tiroe you received training on hew to demonstrate certain 
products. Is that correct? 
Colmere: Ric£it. 
levanger: You also indicated you were paid for those meetings, $10.00. 
Colmere: By the broker. 
Levanger: The broker paid you the $10.00. 
Colmere: Right. 
Levanger: Okay. Ah, you also indicated, ah, they were not a required meeting. 
Is that correct? 
Colmere: No. You didn't have to go. 
Levanger: Vfere there any occasions vrtien you failed to attend, ah, one of these 
training sessions for any reason and then, subsequent to that, ah, 
demonstrated the product for the broker? 
47 
000185 
APPENDIX B (Page 21) 
Colmere: No. I—if I wasn't at the training of that, I did not do the product; 
but then I usually did a different product that I was familiar with, 
Levanger: Okay. Who instructed you on, ah, on when to go to work? 
Colmere: They would call me. 
Levanger: When you say "they", who do you mean? 
Colmere: Tasters would call me. 
Levanger: Who would instruct you on where to go to work? 
Colmere: Tasters. I always figured that Tasters really was not my boss. 
Tasters was a middleman for me, because I was—Tasters is in between 
the broker and me. I am selling the product of the bro—broker. 
Tasters was not my boss. Tasters is a middleman for me. 
Levanger: If that were the case, **iy is it then the broker didn't call you to 
tell you when to go to work? 
Cblmere: Well, because brokers have more to do than just call girls for 
demonstrations. I' ve always— (laughing). 
Judge: You've indicated you've done this type of work on prior occasions 
before you started working with Tasters. 
Colmere: Uh-huh. 
Judge: So you consider yourself a, basically, trained in all the procedures 
involved in, ah, in, ah, hew—-how this work is to be performed. Is 
that correct? 
colmere: Yes. Ah, all women, I feel, knew hew to cook a hamburger or a—or a 
hot dog, which is, ah, all—all women knew hew to feed people. 
Doctorman: Hew about us men? 
Colmere: Wfell, you're the worst of the lot. 
(laughing) 
Doctorman: I apologize, Your Honor, I shouldn't have interrupted. 
Judge: That's all right. 
Levanger: Ah, that statement made me loose my train of thought. (Laughing). 
Doctorman: These hearings can use a little humor new and then. 
Levanger: I knew. Ah, were there any occasions \fAien you received instructions 
from an individual for Tasters in hew to do any of your 
demonstrations? 
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Doctoman: Your Honor, just for the clarity of the record, Pat's gonna—her— 
voice goes up and dcwn a little bit, and if I could request an 
instruction to the witness to be sure that she speaks loud enough so 
we get it on the tape. 
Judge: It should be recording, but be sure you do speak loud enough that it 
can be heard. 
Levanger: You've indicated that there are reports that you must submit as to the 
work that you perform. Is that correct? 
Colmere: Yes. 
Levanger: To your recollection, has there been any occasion when, ah, you have 
submitted a report that has been returned to you? 
Colmere: No. 
Levanger: The equipment that you furnish, card table, frying pan, spatulas, 
these—this is equipment that you have purchased? 
Colmere: Right. 
Levanger: Did you have any of this 'quipment on—equipment on had prior to your 
association with Tasters? 
Colmere: Yes, seme. Heme—home use things that I had in my home before I 
started with Tasters. 
Levanger: So it's equipment you used at home prior to your working for them? 
Colmere: Right. 
Levanger: Do you use this equipment at home? 
Colmere: No. 
Levanger: You—you reserve it for work just with Tasters? 
Colmere: For—for the demonstration. If there's a product that I need during 
the course of that year, like say a—a frying pan or a table or, you 
knew, something that I need to purchase, ah, I purchase it with my cwn 
money. I then, ah, save the receipt; then—I then take it to my tax 
auditor and. she, as the supplies for my derooing job. 
Levanger: Do you have a business license for the work that you do? 
Colmere: No. 
Levanger: Are you listed in any business directory? 
Colmere: No. 
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Dcctorman: And does Tasters financially reward you if—if—if you're a great 
demonstrator or— 
Colmere: No. 
Doctorman: —for exceptional performance? 
Colmere: No. 
Doctorman: Do—does Tasters punish you if your performance is poor? 
Colmere: No. 
Doctorman: When, ah, you submit your expense vouchers to Tasters, do you know 
whether or not Tasters is paying the expense vouchers or whether or 
not the food broker is actually paying your expense? 
Colmere: The food broker is paying the expense. 
Doctorman: Hew do you know that? 
Colmere: I—I—I figure that the—the—like the toothpicks, napkins, paper 
towels or whatever, when I purchase them with my own money, send that 
receipt in with my fact sheet, that fact sheet and receipt is then 
sent to the broker and he reimburses me for the—the product—the—and 
what I have purchased to bring that product come across. 
Doctorman: Okay. So Tasters is still the middleman. 
Colmere: That's h—that's—I—Tasters is not my boss. 
Doctorman: Did you have, ah, any problems with the questionnaire that was sent 
out by the Department? 
Colmere: I can't even remember sending a questionnaire or even signing one. I 
guess I must have, but I can't—I can't remember doing it. 
Judge: Let's ask her about this at the moment now that you brought it up, 
Counsellor. 
Doctorman: That's fine. 
Judge: Is that your signature on there? 
Colmere: That is true. 
Judge: Okay. Do you recognize that questionnaire? 
Colmere: Ye—that's true. 
Judge: Did you ccnplete this questionnaire? 
Colmere: I did. 
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Doctorman: —and your discretion? 
Belrose: Right. 
Doctorman: And you're free to select the time and places where you work? 
Belrose: Reject or accept. 
Doctorman: Okay. 
Belrose: Yeah. 
Doctorman: What—w~we knew that you use equipncient at your—at your 
demonstration, which may include, and I donft knew whether it includes 
a trying pan, a card table, a table cloth, serving pieces and perhaps 
even other things that you might remind me of. What are those things, 
and what is your investment in those items? 
Belrose: A monetary investment? 
Doctorman: Uh-huh. 
Belrose: I would not think it would exceed, ah, $50.00. 
Doctorman: Okay. Do you expense, ah, that equipment on your tax forms as a 
business expense? 
Belrose: I have not. filled out a tax form yet. You mean a — a — 
Doctorman: Since you started work—working for Tasters you haven't— 
Belrose: Right. I have been 1—here less than a year. 
Doctorman: Okay. If, ah, your equipment is damaged in the course" of your 
demonstration, who is responsible for that—that—that financial loss? 
Belrose: I am. 
Doctorman: Are you paid by the job or are you paid by the hour? 
Belrose: The job. 
Doctorman: And you've checked here that you consider yourself an independent 
contractor. 
Belrose: Right. 
Doctorman: Can you tell me v*iy that is. 
Belrose: I can either accept or not accept the jobs that are offered to me. I 
can, if I'm unable to meet the appointment at a late date, I can 
substitute, ah, someone else who is knowledgeable. I take care of my 
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then they tell us, yes, no, well, can't we negotiate a little bit on 
that price; and we come up with a price. 
Doctorman: Okay. And hew is the fee paid? How is the fee determined for the 
demonstrator? 
Oohn: Oh, in modi the same way. Ah, there really, you knew, as far as the 
types of demos, it's pretty straightforward. There are certain kinds 
of demos the hours are dictated by the stores and—and by the numbers 
of people in the stores at the time; and so when we bid the job with 
cur client, we knew what percentage of that would go to the 
demonstrator; and basically we knew hew much it costs us to run cur 
office, to make a profit, pay the bills and we—we generally knew the 
amount of money that we need to make; and, therefore, *diat we can pay 
the demonstrator plus what we want to mate determines the price of the 
demo. 
Doctorman: Does—so it's—it's a ne—both sides are negotiated? 
Cohn: It's negotiated and it's kind of established by the area. Like in Las 
Vegas, we can't get people to work for the same amount that they work 
here. They'll tell us, "No. We won't work for that." or such and 
such another company pays us so much more; and so we have different 
rates for different areas and different types of demonstrations. 
Doctorman: Are demonstrators paid by the hour? 
Gohn: No. They're paid a demo fee for their type of demo. They can—they 
can divide it up any way they want. I mean I've had demonstrators 
say, "Well, do—I get paid for lunch when I work for another company." 
and I say, "Well, if you want to take the amount of money we pay you 
and divide that up by two hours or ten hours, I don't care." I pay 
them a demo fee and they can say whatever they want as far as hew 
their paid. 
Doctorman: Does Tasters review the performance of the demonstrators? 
Cohn: No. And, in fact, occasionally we'll get a report or a call from a 
client who will say, you knew, the demonstrator didn't get the manager 
to sign or didn't—there was no comment about the demonstrator; and we 
send the reports in as we get them. We send them in to our client. 
We have a three-part survey of the demo; and that's so that our client 
knews that that demonstration was done; and we ask the demonstrator to 
keep one copy in case the other get lost in the mail coming to us. We 
keep another copy in case it gets lost going to our client; and many 
times they'll call and say well, they misplaced this or that form and 
part of the reason they like working with Tasters is that we have a 
copy of everything that goes out. For tax purposes, we're required to 
keep a copy of the receipt for the product; and so there's never a 
doubt that if anything gets misplaced or lost, we can always have a 
backup and send it to them; and they will not pay us without having 
the report and the receipts for merchandise or supplies; and, ah, we 
even have to send them—if we have to send things out UPS, we have to 
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Whoever it is, I'm forwarding. (?) 
Go ahead and continue. 
Doctorman: Does Tasters determine the time at which the demonstrations shall b 
performed? 
Cohn: No. 
Doctorman: Who does? 
Cohn: The client. 
Doctorman: And why—do you knew vihy the client selects certain times for the 
performance of demonstrations? 
Cohn: Well only that those are the times that seem to be established 
industry-wide when there are the most shoppers in the store. A—a 
demonstrator can go to the store or—or when she confirms her 
demonstration with the department manager, he might tell her, "Vfell, I 
don't want you to come in at 10. Our store is a night store. Come in 
at noon and work until 8." If she wants to do that, she will. If she 
can't do that, she'll call and say, "Well, I can't do that demo and I 
have a party at my house." It's—it's, ah, it's just all arranged 
with the best thing for the store. If it's better for the store to 
have a half-a-day or a whole day, ah, many times a store won't buy as 
much product as the manufacturer wants them to buy, so they'll give 
them a half-day demo. That's generally the reason there's a half day 
or a whole day. If one chain buys a thousand cases and another has 
only seven stores and buys 500, then they don't get as many demos; and 
it's just strictly controlled with what the client offers to the store 
when they buy the product. 
Doctorman: Can the demonstrator determine the time in which they work by either 
accepting or rejecting various times that are offered? 
Cohn: Oh, yeah, because, ah, we have all kinds of jobs; and sometimes we 
start out on a Monday morning with jobs for the next three or four 
weeks to offer people; and they call us. We tell them what we have, 
when the hours are, ah, if we just took in a run of jobs for 20 
stores, the first person vftio calls us, or the first person we call 
could take any one of those 20 stores or the ones in their area that 
they wanted to go to. 
Doctorman: So th—th€t demonstrator can also determine their location by—where 
they're gonna work by selecting what's available. 
Cohn: Definitely, or by selecting the hours. If there are half-day jobs and 
whole-day jobs, there are people who only work Saturdays or only work 
Fridays orf you knew. It just depends on what they want to do. 
Doctorman: It's up to the demonstrator? 
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Cohn: 
Cohn: 
Doctorman: 
Cohn: 
Doctorman: 
Cohn: 
Doctorman: 
Cbhn: 
Doctorman: 
Cohn: 
Doctorman: 
Cbhn: 
Doctorman: 
Cbhn: 
Uh-huh. Is it up to Tasters as to where and when a particular 
demonstrator works? 
No. She accepts a job or declines. 
While the demonstrator is at the store, who determines the details of 
how the demonstration is performed? 
I would say the demonstrator, unless the—the manager—our clients 
don't like us to use pretzels as an exaitple; because if it's a hot 
dog, the pretzel has extra salt; but we have a number of meat managers 
who don't want toothpicks lost an the floor; and they'll say, "In my 
store, you use pretzels." So in that store she'll use pretzels; and 
it's—it's a small thing, but, you knew, it—it's—they do what the 
manager wants. 
Ah, y—when we discussed your testimony, you—you'd given me an 
example about a tortilla demonstration. Can you recall that? 
It's one of my favorites. 
Why don't you tell us about that. 
We were demonstrating tortillas that were simply to be warmed in a fry 
pan and lightly buttered, cut into serving pieces and sampled; and I 
got a call from a demonstrator in Kemmerer, Wyoming, who said she had 
vised peanut butter and jelly and was concerned, would she get her 
supply money back; and we had talked about it and I said, "Vfell, did 
you sell tortillas?" and she said nobody would buy them because 
people in Kemmerer didn't know about tortillas at that time, but she 
decided to make peanut butter and jelly sandwiches and then she sold 
out; and we just kind of laughed about it and I said, you knew, "I'm 
sending the bill. Of course, you'll be paid, why not?", but it's a 
very simple kind of a situation. What works for you, do it; and if 
you're successful, that's all we want is a successful demonstration 
for our store, for our client. The demonstrator wants to do a good 
job generally. 
So in some locations butter on tortillas makes sense but in other 
locations, peanut butter and jelly makes sense. 
That's the way it goes. It's common sense. Whatever works, do it. 
And Tasters doesn't determine that. That's up to the demonstrator to— 
Right. 
—to do that. 
Right. 
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Doctorman: Does Tasters supervise the demonstrator in the stores in any way? 
Cohn: Not in any way. 
Doctorman: You were sitting here th—with the testimony of a number of your 
workers v*io—one or two of them said that someone from Tasters came to 
the store to, ah, and was at the store with them. Were—why were 
those Tasters employees in the store? 
Cohn: Well, we have one person in Utah that we call an area rep. Iter name 
in Bonnie Jeffs. Bonnie goes to the store, if it's a new person who 
just took a job and needs a report. We tell the people, "If you don't 
have a report, write on a plain piece of paper vtfiere you work, vrtiat yo 
did, hew it went, sign it, have the manager sign it. It's as good as 
a report.," And we get a lot of those. If we can and if we have the 
time and obviously because we do so many demos with one person, there 
is no way we can supervise, but Bonnie will take the cups and forks. 
She'll take a report; and if the demonstrator thinks that Bonnie is 
supervising her, that's in the demonstrator's mind. What may happen 
is that our client will go around, ah, **ien we have these big 
promotions with Proctor and Gamble or General Mills, as I said before, 
they have unlimited resources apparently, and they will send people 
out; but even they cannot check all the demos; because it's just 
physically impossible to get to that many locations and supervise 
every demonstrator. Ah, they may hit a quarter of them or a half of 
them depending on hew many there are in a given weekend; but, ah, 
there's no way to supervise these people sufficiently. Ah, there's no 
way that Tasters could make any money if we had to send a supervisor 
to every job.. 
Doctorman: Does Tasters issue written reports of s—of performance to 
demonstrators? 
Cohn: You mean like critique on their work? 
Doctorman: Yes. 
Cohn: No. 
Doctorman: Does tasters have an employee review of—of a demonstrator on a 
periodic basis? 
Cohn: Absolutely not. 
Doctorman: Is there—does Tasters require the demonstrator to perform 
demonstrations in a certain way or manner or does Tasters give general 
guidelines? 
Cohn: We give g€*neral guidelines: be there, do a good job, return your 
report and, ah, that's about it. 
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experienced demonstrators? 
Oohn: 
Doctorman: 
Oohn: 
Doctorman: 
Cbhn: 
Doctorman: 
Cohn: 
Doctorman: 
Cohn: 
Doctorman: 
Cbhn: 
Doctorman: 
Cohn: 
Oh, no; but the demonstrators working in the store, sometimes they're 
three or four cxxnpanies represented there; and they do talk a lot and 
trade ideas. We hear a lot of that, that they met demonstrators from 
other companies and—but we don't ask anyone to stand over another 
demonstrator and train them. 
And if someone on a questionnaire had answered, ah, that that did in 
fact happen, what would be your explanation for that? 
Well, it was not at Tasters request. 
Are dertoistrators required to take any correspondence courses on hew 
to demonstrate? 
No. 
Are they required to attend any sales meetings? 
No. 
May a demonstrator's services be assigned to others? 
It happens all the time. 
Give us sane examples. 
Ah, I talk to people who are new mothers. They want to work, but 
they can only work half a day, and they split their demo with a friend 
or—we have nursing mothers who trade jobs. We have husband and wife 
teams. We don't even knew, ah, when one takes over from another; and 
in fact, two days ago I had a call from a person up in Tremonton vrtio 
called to inquire vftiat we pay; and, you know, it was just a "Hello, 
tell me hew much you pay." And I didn't knew if it was a client or 
somebody wanting to demonstrate, so I asked who it was and why they 
wanted to know; and she told me that she had been doing demos for us 
for a long time. We didn't knew she did demos for Tasters, because 
the person that got her into doing demos apparently took the job, gave 
it to her, the other person got paid and paid her a portion of what 
she was paid; and she said she caught on to that, that Tasters didn't 
knew anything about her; and she wanted to work directly for us, 
'cause she felt she'd get more of her pay; and I said, "Well, that's 
really interesting and I'll put you on the list. We'll call you." 
Does Tasters have any objection that there was a middleman involved in 
the—the work performed? 
Well, no, because I think it happens a lot, just as indicated by the 
Patsy Buckmiller testimony earlier who—Patsy is in Price and she 
takes jobs and she gives them to other people. I really didn't know 
that Debbie Henry also did that. I had no idea they were going in the 
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Doctorman: And do you have demonstrators that, say, work only once a—once a 
year? 
Cohn: Well, we have demonstrators who will only work the Smith's Food Shew; 
and we'll have demonstrators who, ah, I'll call—they'll tell us 
they'll call Tasters when they want to work, you knew, don't bother 
calling them in between because they may only want to work new and 
then; and then we'll have demonstrators *Aio want to work every 
weekend and they'll call us and they'll say, I'm available for this 
and this and this week. If we have jobs, we'll line them up. If not, 
we'll put them on a list and call them v*ien we do. They'll call back, 
"I still don't have a job for the first week in March." It depends on 
the aggressiveness of the demonstrator; and it's really gotten to the 
point \diere I would say 80 per cent of our jobs are filled by 
demonstrators calling testers; and, ah, these people who demonstrate 
generally don't want to work during the week; and it's even hard to 
reach them; and that's why we can have a person work a half a day, 
because the best time to reach people is, let's say, between 8 and 
noon; so that person in our office is on the phone constantly all 
morning just talking to people, people who call us or peqple that we 
call. 
Doctorman: And what's the ratio of people—of demonstrators calling in for work 
as opposed to you soliciting them to—to work? 
Cohn: Oh, I would say 80 per cent of them call us. 
Doctorman: Do you have demonstrators that work in multiple cities? 
Cohn: Oh, yeah. Vfe have, ah— 
Doctorman: Why don't you give us some examples. 
Cohn: We have some people who, ah, because they know we work in six states, 
we have a gal whose husband lectures and he—when he goes to Reno, she 
calls and says, "I want to work in Reno in two weeks because my 
husband's gonna be there." or "I'm going dewn to Bullhead City for 
the su—for the winter, certainly not for the summer. Ah, one of the 
people who responded to this questionnaire, I think, is in Bullhead 
right new, and she'll work there. Or— 
Doctorman: Who is that? 
Cohn: Vi Coleman. 
Doctorman: Okay. 
Cohn: And she'll work in Las Vegas. It—it's just, ah, an interesting 
thing; and if people move, they say, "Well, I'm gonna be in Boise, you 
knew, I'm moving to Boise. Call me for jobs in Boise." and that's the 
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way it works. 
Doctorman: New as I understand it, Vi Coleman works in Salt Lake, Bullhead City 
and Tucson? 
Cohn: Uh-huh. 
Doctorman: As—as her travel schedule determines. 
Cohn: Right. And she tells us when. We don't pay for her travel. We don't 
pay for her phone calls. It's what she likes to do. 
Doctorman: She works when—where she wants to work. 
Cdhn: Definitely. 
Doctorman: Okay. Can the demonstrator establish their cam time schedule? 
Cohn: Yeah. Many times they do. If they want to leave early because they 
have an engagement, they tell the store manager, "I'm exxning in from 
10 to 6." even if we've said it's fran 11 to 7; and if it's okay with 
him, it's fine with us. Most of the time we don't know all of these 
things that are going on; and we hear about them in much the same way 
we heard about Debbie Henry an—supervising in Price today. 
Doctorman: Is the demonstrator free to work when and for whan he or she chooses? 
Cohn: Oh, yes. 
Doctorman: Can they work for multiple cenpanies? 
Cohn: Yes. 
Doctorman: Do you have people who hold dewn full-time jobs? 
Cohn: Ah, yes, we do. 
Doctorman: In addition to their demonstration work. 
Cohn: We have teachers. We have nurses. We have gentlemen. We have 
retired men. We have people who go to school and then they schedule 
their Fridays and Saturdays free so that, you knew, they're only in 
school Monday through Thursday. Ah, we have teachers who tell us they 
make more doing demos than teaching. 
Doctorman: That's unfortunate. Hqpefully the legislature will do something about 
that this session. 
Does the demonstrator—so a demonstrator's not restricted from doing 
other work. 
Cohn: Absolutely not. 
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Doctorman: Are demonstrators paid at the same time you pay other accounts 
payable? 
Cohn: Yes. 
Doctorman: And what do you—do you consider their—what do you consider your 
payment f rem Tasters to a demonstrator to be? 
Cohn: It's a payable. We—we pay them vAien we pay our bills. 
Doctorman: Is it a wage? 
Cohn: No. It's a demo fee. We also work with other demo companies. If a 
client calls and gives us 40 demos and three of them are in New 
Mexico, Tasters doesn't work in New Mexico, but we have affiliates 
there, ah, and we call them and say, "We have three demos. Can you 
handle it in Albuquerque?" and then we'll pay Elite Presentations just 
as we pay the demonstrator. She sends us the report, and we pay her 
company when we pay the demonstrators. 
Doctorman: So there may be occasion where you'll need to use yet another 
middleman to—to get to the demonstrator. 
Cohn: Oh, many, yeah, 'cause we don't work in Billings, Montana; and we get 
jobs there. Some jobs we do as an accomrtiodation to our client. Now, 
in Billings, we make a few dollars on that job; but the person that we 
use in Albuquerque charges more than we do; so it's strictly a service 
to our client. Vfe're glad to have the 37 jobs, and it's easier for 
him if we send them to Albuquerque than for he; and, you know, I'll 
tell them, "Well, I can give you the name of a company there." and he 
says, "No. Just take care of it." 
business accommodation most of the time. 
So, we do that; and it's a 
Doctorman: 
Cohn: 
Doctorman: 
Cohn: 
Doctorman: 
Cohn: 
Doctorman: 
Is the—are the demonstrators required to pay all of their own 
expenses up front? 
Oh, yes. 
Okay. Are the demonstrators reimbursed for all or part of their 
expenses? 
Well, only for supplies like napkins, toothpicks, paper towels, the 
supplies that it takes to do the demo; but if a demonstrator sends us 
a bill for a paring knife or an apron or a table cloth, we don't pay 
it; and we just cross it off the receipt. 
Who—^who is ultimately responsible for the payment of the expenses for 
the serving of the food, the toothpicks and napkins, vfriatever? 
The client. 
Tasters does not pay for that out of its overhead. 
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Judge: 
Doctorman: 
Cohn: 
Doctorman: 
Cohn: 
Doctorman: 
Cohn: 
Doctorman: 
Odin: 
submit this and have— 
I111 receive that as Exhibit Fifteen. 
—have you look at Exhibit Fifteen, 
that was prepared by your office? 
Sandi; and is this the Exhibit 
Yes, it was; and it's just a partial list of people that, ah, the 
office staff remembered and recalled that, yes, these people had said, 
"Well, I canft work this week. I'm working for Dynamic" or "I'm 
working for Classic." \tfiatever. We don't keep a record of it, and we 
don't really care. 
If, ah, a demonstrator's producing a good result, are they 
terminated? 
Not unless they tell us. We never terminate anybody, v*iich means take 
them off the list unless they say, "I'm moving to Oklahoma and I won't 
be there." or, ah, you knew, just for whatever reason, "I'm taking a 
full-time job." Mostly they don't even tell us; and then we keep 
calling; and maybe at the end of the year, they've never worked all 
year, the ccmnputer will just automatically dump anybody that's never 
received any pay. 
But if they were to call you, ah, and say, like the 80 per cent of the 
people vtfio do that call you and say they wanted to work, vrtiat would 
you do? 
Well, we try to keep anybody v*io wants to work working. Those who say 
"Yes", they're obviously the ones who work. 
Who is responsible for the satisfactory completion of the 
demonstration? 
The demonstrator. That's from start to finish. 
Doctorman: Is the demonstrator obligated to perform a satisfactory demonstration 
as a condition preceding for their payment? 
Cohn: No. They would be paid unless they walked off the job or didn't 
complete it or in some really—I can't imagine **iy they would— 
Doctorman: Maybe you didn't understand my question. Is the—is the—must the 
demonstrator satisfactory complete the demonstration in order— 
Cohn: Yeah. 
Doctorman: —to get paid? 
Cohn: Yeah. She has to do the job, get the manager to sign that she was 
there, return her report and then she's paid. 
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Doctorman: Does pa—does Tasters pay a car allowance or milage? 
Cohn: No. 
Doctorman: Does Tasters provide an office or a place to work— 
Cohn: No. 
Doctorman: —for the demonstrators? 
Cohn: Absolutely not. 
Doctorman: Does Tasters pay the—any overhead of the demonstrators other—per— 
does Tasters personally pay any of the overhead of the demonstrators? 
Cohn: No. Nothing. 
Doctorman: Does Tasters have a personnel name? 
Cohn: No. 
Doctorman: Did tha—for demonstrators? 
Cohn: No. Vfe have seme incidental things like "Fourteen Things to 
Remember"« Vfe have a suggested list of what you need and then it's 
common sense. If you're doing cheese and crackers, you don't need 
three quarters of the things on the list; but people call us and ask 
us questions; and we've gotten to the point where rather than answer 
every question, we'll just zip that out; just in the same way we have 
a little form letter that says, "Your receipt was not included with 
your report. Therefore, we cannot reimburse you for supplies." And 
it's just easier to send that, since we do so many, than to sit and 
write little notes to everybody. Vfe just have a file with things that 
are appropriate and that's what we do. 
Doctorman: Can demonstrators earn vacation pay? 
Cohn: No. 
Doctorman: Can demonstrators earn sick pay? 
Cohn: No. 
Doctorman: Are there any career opportunities for—for demonstrators within 
Tasters? 
Cohn: No. Only that, ah, if we needed someone in our office, and someone 
said, "I'd like to change and do office work.", we have had two people 
who came into our office from being demonstrators. 
Doctorman: But the— 
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Oohn: That's just incidental. 
Doctorman: Okay. And it's clear that Tasters doesn't monitor the performance of 
demonstrators with supervisors. 
Cohn: No, we do not, nor could we. 
Doctorman: May a demonstrator take a trip or leave on vacation without giving you 
notice? 
Cohn: 
Cohn: 
Oh, they do all the time. 
Doctorman: Does Tasters exercise control over the detail of the work within the 
store by the demonstrator? 
Not at all. 
Doctorman: Does Tasters inspect the sales presentations by the demonstrators? 
Cohn: No. Not unless required by our client, who then pays for that 
service; and generally they do that themselves. 
Doctorman: That's the exception. 
Cohn: The exception. 
Doctorman: Okay. As a general rule, is there any ccaitact between Tasters and the 
demonstrator while the demonstrator is at the store? 
Cohn: Only if supplies are necessary; and, see we generally send—to an—any 
place out of Salt Lake, we mail the supplies and charge our client 
freight and for the supplies. If it's within the area and they're not 
too many people, generally it's last minute stuff that Bonnie 
delivers, jobs that were set up late and they require supplies. Ah, 
we've even had her run up, you know, to—to Ogden or somewhere if it's 
last minute. Ah, if it's impossible for us to get supplies there, 
then we let the demonstrator purchase them wherever she can; and it's 
usually at a higher expense to our client; so we try to help our 
clients out by providing a case of spoons that we can deliver rather 
than the demonstrator buying 25 spoons in a box for, you know, 69 
cents multiplied by 500. It's just more expensive. 
Doctorman: That's a service for the client? 
Oohn: Right. Which is another reason they call us instead of other people 
that—that don't offer that service. 
Doctorman: What—during a calendar quarter, what's the amount of unemployment 
tax that you pay to the Department of Employment Security? 
Cohn: It usually runs between $450.00 and $500.00 per quarter to Utah 
Department of Unemployment Securities. 
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Oohn: Only if the client said— 
Levanger: And if that's the case, isn't— 
Cohn: —"I don't want to pay you." It just never happened. 
Levanger: Weren't you dealing out some sort of reprimand if they weren't being 
paid for that service? 
Oohn: I guess that would be an ultimate reprimand. It just doesn't happen. 
Levanger: Well, you indicated earlier that it does happen. 
Cohn: Well, not vftiere we don't pay them or reprimand them. Vfe discuss it. 
I had a demonstrator v/ho once told a customer she was too fat and 
didn't need another sample; and I was just rather shocked; and **ien I 
asked her about it, she said, "Golly, I knew I shouldn't have said 
that." Bit she has worked for us since then. Ah, vdhenever she says 
"yes", she works; and she, I hope, doesn't insult customers. 
Levanger: You indiaated also a little earlier a situation with, ah, with the 
individual at Tremonton, apparently doing some demonstration work that 
you were not aware of? 
Cohn: Not aware at all. The person vAio gave her the job gave her our 
report, but then that person signed her name, Lori Herdalgo; and her 
name is an this list, because she works—she sets up demos for three 
or four other companies. 
Levanger: So you have no concern whether this individual is really qualified to 
do the demonstration at least in fact representing Tasters? 
Cohn: As long as she does her job well and the manager writes, "good job" or 
no comment at all and sends that form back, Tasters is satisfied. 
Levanger: You would have no concern then that this individual might be like the 
other inclividual you talked about for—that needed to be in a 
sheltered workshop, that she too might need to be there? 
Cohn: No, because the managers always write back and say, "job well done" or 
"send her back" or "okay", the number on comment we get from managers 
in Utah is "She done good." And if she done good, and I don't mean to 
be facetious, but that truly is the number one comment that we get. 
Levanger: So you would receive a report back from—from the person you weren't 
aware of in Tremonton, that was doing the work? Would they not be 
some indication there also that somebody else was assisting her? 
Cohn: No, we didn't knew at all. 
Levanger: Wfell, one of the ladies today gave testimony, a lady from Price, and 
I'm sorry I can't recall her name, that there were occasions when a— 
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that to our $25.00; and that's how we ocxne up with a fee to our 
client. 
Levanger: So if I want to think through it and I say, okay, I'm working eight 
hours at $35.00, I'm being paid the equivalent of $4.75 an hour. 
Cohn: Right. 
Levanger: And from that I need to deduct my FICA and my, ah— 
Cohn: Right. Now, this other demonstrator says, "I only work seven hours, 
because I took my lunch and ray breaks; and I'm making $5.00 an hour." 
I don't tell them hourly. We never ever discuss hourly and— 
Levanger: All right— 
Cohn: —you can see the reason we don't is because we're following the 
guidelines of an independent contractor. 
Levanger: I'm—I'm— 
Cohn: Never discuss hours. 
Levanger: I'm there with that card table and I've been cooking the chicken and 
all of a sudden the leg falls out from under the table and the pan 
falls on the floor, hits somebody on the toe, it splatters them with— 
with grease all over a $300.00 pants suit and it breaks her toe. What 
happens? 
Cohn: The demonstrator has a problem. 
Levanger: What if I tell you I'm not going to pay for it? 
Cohn: We have never had that happen. 
Levanger: Okay. It's happening new. I'm telling you I'm not going to pay for 
it. 
Cohn: We're going to tell you that you're an independent contractor and that 
you signed a contract that you're independent and you're responsible. 
New, we do have liability insurance. We have never submitted a claim 
on our liability insurance; so you're inventing a situation that could 
happen; and I'm saying whenever anybody gets hurt, anything could 
happen. Biey could sue Testers, they could sue the demonstrator, they 
could sue Costco, they could sue the chicken people. We don't knew 
what they will do; and until they do it, we're saying we have never 
had a claim. Vfe have had one demonstrator cut her finger at a food 
shew and we've had one claim to workers compensation that we know of. 
Levanger: I guess that's really my point. That this is— 
Cohn: And it's not risky business. 
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SandiCohn 
LJ f g S f r TASTERS LTD., INC. 
1381 Ea*2H» South, SubB 
Salt Late City, Utah 84105 
(801)4664366 
(80D466-DEM0 
VERY IMPORTANT THINGS TO REMEMBER!!1 
MOST IMPORTANT THING TO REMEMBER: CALL YOUR STORE NOW AMD THEM CALL AGAIN 
ABOUT THREE DAYS BEFORE TO CONFIRM YOUR DEMO I III! 
Please read this before you go to work, and go through your training 
materials often. 
1. Dress appropriately. Look professional. Please wear an APRON 1 
2. Be on time. 
3. Always set a beautiful table and use a neat tablecloth. 
4. Take a careful inventory of your product and write the numbers 
on your report sheet. 
5. Serve a SAMPLE size serving of your product. 
6. ALWAYS use the product name. 
7. Try to sample every person that comes into your store. 
8. Keep an accurate count of the units used for your demo. 
9. Keep your area clean and do not eat at your demo table. 
10. Take h hour lunch and two 15 minute breaks. Try not to have 
all of the demonstrators go to lunch at the same time. 
11. SMILE!!! Have fun and be creative. 
12. Be AGGRESSIVE and try to SELL OUT! Ml! 
13. Complete your report sheet, filling in every section. Attach a receipt 
if you have any expenses, we cannot pay you without It. Sign it and 
have your manager sign too. 
14. MAIL YOUR REPORT ON YOUR WAY HOME AT THE END OF YOUR DEMO! I! 
PLEASE DO NOT MENTION THE NAME OF ANY OTHER STORE WHEN YOU ARE AT WORK. YOU 
ARE REPRESENTING ONLY THE STORE THAT YOU ARE IN ON THE DAY OF YOUR DEMO AND IT 
WOULD BE IN VERY POOR TASTE TO EVEN MENTION ANOTHER COMPANY. THE SAME GOES FOR 
THE PRODUCT THAT YOU ARE SELLING. IT IS THE VERY BEST AND THERE IS NO NEED TO 
COMPARE IT, BY NAME, TO ANY OTHER ITEM. 
2/87 "J* l^ltfY^ rV/jm/T 0(,«039 
""*• TASTERS L I D , INC. "IKS? K 
g ^ # SwdiCohn 1381 East 2M0 South, Sale B jft (80D46&DEMO 
PACKING YOUR BASKET 
A good nights sleep 
You - All neat end clean 
Folding Table 
Tablecloth 
Electric frying pan 
25 Foot extension cord 
Roll of wide masking tape 
Wastepaper sack (from the store only) 
Spatula 
Sharp knife 
Serving fork 
Nice platter 
Smock or apron 
Small cutting board 
Grease can with lid 
Moist: cloth (in plastic bag) 
Scissorsf pen, marking pen and tape 
Toothpicks, paper towels and napkins (save receipts) 
Borrow a plant from the produce department (always ask) 
Report form and envelope 
NO - NQfs 
NO children (yours) 
NO smoking on the job 
NO chairs 
NO books 
Tipiuv, EXHIBIT JO£ 000040 
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TASTERS LTD., INC. 
DEMONSTRATION REPORT 
1381 East 2100 South, Sustei 
Sab Lake City, Utah 8410 
(801)4664366 
(80U466-DEMC 
CALL STORE NOWTO CONFIRM AVAILABILITY OF PRODUCT AND AGAIN 2 DAYS BEFORE DEMO 
- Name of Manager called to verify demo: ydfrfpf' Date Called:. 
Project* 
Store Name: 
'/<r Z. tot Demo: 
SunD MonO UkU WWOthunD 
Time of Ocma LLzJL^StML iffi 
Store* 
Address: 
^ ^ T.u>&^M.3£S-e&0/ Dept: DelO Meaj)^ ProduceO 
—..•>. . . * ^ — . - or tot. Please, specify # of units 
Product Demonstrated: 
Beginning Inventory. 
Less Ending Inventory: 
Equals Total 
Less Samples Used For Demo: 
Amount Sold / . 
Regular Prtce J}//'4rf 
Total Expenses (if any) _ 
frcasej2~£L.Areyoureportinajnunits , , — 
•Receipt must be attached for Reiml 
.cases. 
LiZZ. 
y & L fiaL<i<*j 
c
-^Number Distributed - ^ - I 
SAVE EMPTY DEMO WRAPPERS FOR 
COUPONS: At start of Demo—-&~m Return extra coupons to Tauten 
Use this credit form: Vfes D N o j 8 ^ 
If yes. throw empty wrappers away after counting. 
If no, leave empty wrappers with department manager. 
Leave yellow copy with department manager Mes D 
Credit Expense incurred: 
(Do not include items paid for) 
CREDIT MEMO 
NoD EXHIBIT 10 3£r 
@$ 
m 
@$ 
@$ 
Position of Vbur Demo 
List ALL other Demos Going on C&Ba&JL 
Store Traffic: Ught Medium L ^ H 
Number of Persons Sampled j h 
22 
Clear & Sunny 
&£LLkL 
JM&1/**S 
Overcast _ X _ Rain. .Snow. 
Manager's Comments: *. 
Manager's Signature: 
6T&<fa rfPtttfut? —&J2&L 
>em 
5f 
De onstrator's Signature: 
. Qtffle Days Worked Sun 
:
 S. 
 3 Jfat.toi&ttU'TZS 
r\ Mon Tue Wed Thurs /rriy^S 
Sec# ///- JJ- mi @® 
REPORT SHEETS APPENDIX D (Page 2) 
Our sales are troving and the demand for our services is ever expanding* Thanks to you 
for your great work 
In order to keep our great reputation, we need to do an even better job of reporting. 
Please be extra careful with your reports. Fill in EVERY lined I We must know: What yoi 
beginning inventory Is, ending inventor, UNITS USED FOR SAMPLES and your expenses, if any 
If you are doing mote than one product, such as beef & meat franks, list both on your shet 
and count them separately. Your receipt must be attached for reimbursement. Don't hold • 
co chem and 'send them in a few weeks later, as we bill our client and then cannot add cha 
at the later date*..and we can't get paid until we submit all of your forms. 
Keep track of the product you use by placing the empty demo wrapper in a bag marked wish 
name we enter on your report under: Save Empty demo wrappers for: leave this bag with you 
department manager. 
Put the regular and sale price in and fill in the remainder of the form as we need to kno< 
as much as possible about your demo. Please make comments!!! We love comments!!! In the 
consumer response section, tell us what the shopper really said about the product. Your 
comment should be about the product, your day, the store, etc. 
If your form is late in getting to you, or you do not have one at all, please make up a p 
of plain paper with the same information. If we have confirmed a job with you by telepho 
and your form is late, the job is ON unless ve call you. It really helps if you will 
jot all the information down when you are called. 
THE CREDIT FORM: This is the section outlined in black. Do not include items that you 
have paid for in this section, such as toothpicks, napkins, etc. Do list items used for 
your demo that you do not pay for. 
The credit form is only used for a few clients, and will be checked yes when it is 
necessary. The following is an example: 
Use this credit form Yes J j f No D Do not include ittmt you have paid for. 
Credit Expenses incurred: /* f v ! ^ Total 
_& forf*\&u*Ut „ . i f = rt'V 
*z? 
Leave che yellow copy of our report with your manager when you use this credit section. 
Now the fun part—get your manager to make a comment too. Be aure that you both sign the 
bottom of the form. If you share a job with someone be sure both of you sign so we can 
pay you correctly. There is always someone who can sign your sheet. If you want your 
manager to sign and you know that he or she will be leaving before you do, make arrangeme 
vich them in advance. If you do sell out,write SOLD OUT on your report. It isn't 
necessary to enter the time you leave on your report when you aell out. Send us your 
personal messages on another piece of paper as the reports goes in to our clients, and 
they are not interested in our "other stuff". 
:
";li in your report sheets carefully, completly 4 legibly. Return your signed report on 
the day your demo is completed and do keep the pink copy for your records. 
•..\Vr. FUN AND SELL! ! ! SELL! ! ! SELL! ! ! - . | | | H ^ 
nV!J$£?7 u;i«042 
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DLM/KM/AH/ab 
BOARD OF REVIEW 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
Unemployment Compensation Appeals 
TASTERS, LTD. INC. 
Employer No. 1-117373-0 : 
: Case No. 90-A-4044-T 
: DECISION 
: Case No. 90-BR-167-T 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY : 
Tasters Ltd, Inc. appeals the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge in the above entit led matter, which held Tasters to be subject to the 
Utah Empl oyment Security Act with respect to i ts employment of "demonstra-
tors". Specifically, the ALJ ruled the demonstrators could not be classified 
as independent contractors under §35-4-22(j)(5) of the Act. 
After careful consideration of the record and Tasters' contentions 
on appeal, the Board of Review finds that the demonstrators in question do 
not meet the cr i ter ia of §35-4-22(j)(5) for independent contractors. The 
Board of Review therefore affirms the decision of the ALJ and holds the 
demonstrators to be in the employ of Tasters and subject to coverage under 
the provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act. 
Based upon its review of the record, the Board of Review makes the 
following findings of fact: Tasters is in the business of providing workers to 
brokers and manufacturers1 representatives for the purpose of demonstrating 
various products in grocery and department stores. Each demonstrator works 
on an on-call, part-time basis with no guarantee of any particular schedule or 
number of work hours. Each demonstrator is free to accept or decline offered 
assignments as he or she sees f i t . 
Tasters gives each demonstrator a two-page set of written instruc-
tions governing the performance of their duties, including details such as 
a t t i r e , length of breaks, product display, and demonstration tactics. Demon-
strators are prohibited from having children present, smoking, reading or 
si t t ing while on the job. Orientation and other training sessions are some-
times held for demonstrators, but attendance is not required. Payment for 
attendance at such meetings is made by Tasters1 cl ient brokers or manu-
facturers. 
Once a demonstrator accepts a particular assignment, he or she must 
report for work according to a set schedule. The demonstrators1 performance 
in the store may be monitored by Tasters1 f ie ld representative or by Tasters' 
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clients. While individualized supervision is not generally provided, the 
f ie ld representative and clients give instruction when necessary. At the end 
of each demonstration, demonstrators ar§ required to submit a report to 
Tasters. 
The demonstrators are either provided the supplies used in demon-
strations or are reimbursed for the expense of such supplies. The demonstra-
tors provide equipment such as frying pans and card tables at their own 
expense. Tasters sometimes provides microwave ovens, then charges i ts cl ients 
rental fees for their use. 
Demonstrators are paid on a "per day" basis. Occasionally, demon-
strators delegate assignments to other demonstrators, who then are paid for 
the work. Tasters carries wsrker's compensation insurance on the demonstrators 
but provides no other fringe benefits and does not withhold payroll taxes from 
demonstrators' paychecks. 
The demonstrators and Tasters are free to terminate their re la-
tionship with each other at any time. Demonstrators perform their services 
under Tasters1 business name. Although they are free to perform services for 
other employers, none advertise, maintain offices or obtain business licenses. 
In judging whether the foregoing facts substantiate Tasters' posi-
tion that its demonstrators are independent contractors, the Board of Review 
is guided by §35-4-22(j) (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act, which pro-
vides in material part as follows: 
Services performed by an individual for wages or under any 
contract of hire, written or o ra l , express or implied, are 
considered to be employment subject to this chapter unless i t 
is shown to the satisfaction of the commission that the indi -
vidual is an independent contractor. The commission shall 
analyze all of the facts in Subsections (A) through (T) under 
the common-law rules applicable to the employer-employee rela-
tionship to determine i f an individual is an independent 
contractor. An individual is an independent contractor i f the 
weight of the evidence supports that finding. The following 
ing factors are to be considered i f applicable. (Factors A 
through T follow, but have been ommitted due to their length.) 
Under §35-4-22(j) ( 5 ) , above, wages paid to an individual for personal services 
are subject to unemployment insurance contributions unless the services are 
performed by an independent contractor. §35-4-22(j)T5) establishes 20 
separate factors for assessing whether status as an independent contractor 
exists, i t also recognizes that each factor may not be pertinent in e^ery case 
and should be considered only i f applicable. To understand and apply 
§35-4-22(j)(5)'s 20 factors, i t is necessary to understand their development 
in the Act. 
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Prior to April 24, 1989, §35-4-22(j) (5) used a two-part test to 
determine independent contractor status. F i rs t , the individual performing 
services must be free from control and direction from the party for whom the 
services were provided. Second, the individual performing services must be 
independently established in an occupation, trade or business of his own. 
However, because the Internal Revenue Service also made determinations of 
independent contractor status using only the test of "control and direction", 
a lack of conformity existed between determinations of the Department and 
Internal Revenue Service. To increase conformity, the Legislature repealed 
the two part test of §35-4-22(j) (5) and replaced i t with a test that relied 
upon 20 factors the IRS had identified as generally significant in determining 
"control and direction". In summary, §35-4-22( j ) (5)*s two-part test of 
freedom from control and direction and independent establishment in business 
was replaced by a 20-part test focusing on control and direction. 
§35-4-22(j) (5) as amended recognizes that not each of i ts 20 fac-
tors (A through T) wi l l apply in every si tuat ion. §35-4-22(j)(5) further 
recognizes the necessity of "weighing" factors according to their significance 
under the facts of a particular case. The Board of Review must therefore 
identify those factors which are signficant in the present case, then deter-
mine whether the evidence with respect to those factors establish the freedom 
from control and direction necessary to support a finding of independent con-
tractor status. 
Factors A, B, 6, J and K relate to the amount of direct control 
exercised over the individual in the performance of his or her duties. As 
the extent of control over details increases, an indiviudual w i l l be more 
likely to be considered an employee. In this case, Tasters te l l s i ts dem-
onstrators when to report for work, when to leave, and how long to spend on 
breaks and lunch. I t te l ls them to remain standing, not to smoke, not to 
have children with them, and not to read. Demonstrators are instructed on 
proper dress and personal demeanor. The foregoing is only a sample of the 
detailed instructions Tasters gives i ts demonstrators. While Tasters is not 
staffed to the extent that such matters can be closely observed, Tasters has 
nonetheless exercised its right to give the instructions. The Board of 
Review concludes the foregoing factors strongly support a finding that Tasters 
exerts control and direction over the demonstrators. 
A second group of factors, C, F, H, 0, P, Q and R, pertain to the 
degree of independence and separation existing between the individuals per-
forming services and the entity for which services are performed. A high 
degree of separation tends to establish an independent contractor relation-
ship while integration indicates an employment relationship. Due to the 
unique nature of Tasters1 business, the Board considers many of the factors 
in this category to be of l i t t l e significance. For example, Tasters1 business 
does not require full-time employees or a high degree of contact with i ts 
demonstrators. Nor does i t require or permit a substantial investment in 
equipment. However, the Board does consider factor R to be significant. The 
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demonstrators had not taken the steps to estaablish independent business 
activity that an independent contractor would be expected to take. In con-
clusion, most factors in this category are not significant in evaluating 
Tasters1 control over i ts demonstrators, except factor R, which supports the 
finding that the demonstrators were not independent contractors. 
The third category of factors, items D, E, L, S and T, relate to 
the issue of whether a continuing personal relationship between employer and 
employee has been established, or a l te rnat ive ly , whether the relationship was 
merely a discrete, job-by-job arrangement in which performance is enforceable 
under contract law. Certain of the factors in this category are significant 
to this case and support a finding of independent contractor status. For 
example, Tasters permitted the demonstrators to delegate assignments to 
others and compensated demonstrators on a "per job" basis. On balance, the 
nature of the legal relationship between Tasters and the demonstrators re-
sembles that of an independent contractor relationship. 
The last category of factors, items I , M and N, focus on the demon-
strators1 investment in equipment and the allocation of expenses between the 
demonstrations and Tasters. These factors are not useful under the circum-
stances of this case since equipment requirements are minimal and expenses 
are reimbursed by Tasters' c l ients . 
In summary, the 20 factors of §35-4-22( j ) (5) have been evaluated by 
the Board of Review and classif ied into four general groups. The f i r s t group 
relates to the amount of direct control exercised by Tasters, while the 
second group pertains to the extent of integration of the demonstrators into 
Tasters1 business. In l ight of the facts of this case, both categories 
indicate that the employment relationship between Tasters and i ts demonstra-
tors is that of employer and employees. While the third group of factors, 
pertaining to the legal relationship between Tasters and i ts demonstrators, 
favors a contrary conclusion and the fourth group, pertaining to allocation 
of expenses and investment, is neutral , the f i r s t and second categories are 
the most significant to this case. The Board of Review concludes that 
the weight of the evidence when viewed under the standards set forth in 
§35-4-22(j)(5) (A) through (T) does not support a finding that Tasters' 
demonstrators are independent contractors. The Board of Review therefore 
holds that they are in employment subject to the provisions of the Utah 
Employment Security Act. 
Two additional points in Tasters' appeal require brief discussion. 
F irst , Tasters argues that the questionnaire prepared by the Department and 
completed by Tasters demonstrators should have been excluded from the record 
because they lacked stat is t ica l va l id i t y , were not understood by the demon-
strators and contained questions which did not conform to the 20 factors set 
forth in §35-4-(22)j) (5 ) . The questionnaires are insignificant to the Board 
of Review's decision in this matter, since the Board of Review relied instead 
upon the demonstrators' testimony from the appeal hearing, given under oath 
and subject to cross-examination. Even i f the questionnaires were removed 
from the record, the Board of Review's decision would remain unchanged. 
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The second point requiring response is Tasters1 contention that a 
previous informal IRS determination that one of Tasters' demonstrators was an 
independent contractor should prompt a similar determination in the present 
case. However, the Board of Review must apply the provisions of the Utah 
Empl qyment Security Act according to the facts in the record before i t . 
Where the Employment Security Act and federal standards are the same, i t is 
probable that the same result will be reached. Occasionally, differences in 
fact-finding will result in contrary decisions. In this case, the Board has 
had the benefit of exhaustive fact finding and active participation from the 
Department and Tasters. The Board of Review is unwilling to ignore such a 
complete record In order to adopt an informal opinion of the IRS which appears 
to violate the IRS1 own precedents. 
This decision becomes final on the date i t is mailed, and any 
further appeal roust be made within 30 days from the date of mailing. Your 
appeal must be submitted in writing to the Utah Court of Appeals, Midtown 
Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. To f i l e 
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the 
Court a Petition for Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, 
pursuant to §63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and 
Rule 14 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, followed by a Docketing 
Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9 and 24-27, Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
Dated this 10th day of July, 1990. 
Date Mailed: July 20, 1990 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby cert i fy that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on this £& — 
day of July, 1990, by mailing the same, postage prepaid, United States 
mail to : 
Tasters Ltd., Inc. 
Attn: Sandi Cohn 
1381 East 2100 South, Suite B 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Gary E. Doctorman 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Tasters L td . , Inc. 
50 West Broadway, Suite 400 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake Ci ty , Utah 84147-0898 
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